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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Under a theory of respondeat superior, an employer will not be 
held liable for a supervisory employee's sexual harassment of 
another employee, while off duty and not at the workplace, if 
no sufficient nexus exists between the supervisor's conduct and 
his or her employment to permit an inference that his or her 
conduct arose in the course of employment. 
FACTS 
Capitol City Foods, Inc., v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
418 (1992), cert. denied. Mary T. ("Mary") began working at a 
Capitol City Foods' Burger King franchise in January, 1989.1 
Vernon Johnson ("Vernon") was the night shift supervisor with 
whom Mary made plans to go out for a drink on January 31, 
1989, as neither of them were scheduled to work that day.2 On 
January 31, as arranged, Vernon picked up Mary from a grocery 
store; she was wearing her Burger King uniform.s Unbeknownst 
to Vernon, another employee had changed the schedule and had 
scheduled Mary to work that day at 5 p.m.4 Vernon telephoned 
Burger King, reprimanded that employee, and informed him 
that Mary would arrive late, if at all. Ii Vernon then took Mary to 
his parents' house where Mary alleged that she was raped by 
Vernon.6 The following day Mary told a manager what had hap-
pened, and quit her job shortly thereafter.7 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mary filed a sexual harassment complaint with the Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and received a 
1. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 419 (1992). 
2. Id. Both Mary and Vernon believed a co-worker would accompany them; how-
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letter informing her of her right to sue.s Mary then filed a law-
suit naming as co-defendants Capitol City Foods, Inc. (hereinaf-
ter defendant), Burger King, Inc., Vernon Johnson, and his par-
ents.9 Seven causes of action were alleged against Capitol City 
Foods, including sexual harassment.1o The first cause of action 
alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex (sexual har-
assment) against Mary, which included requiring her "to work in 
an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment."ll The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, 
summary adjudication on this issue on the ground that Vernon 
. was not acting as Capitol City's agent when the alleged rape oc-
curred. 12 Mary opposed the motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that Vernon's "conduct was within the scope of his 
employment, and that agency principles did not apply under the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)."13 The Superior 
Court denied the motion as to the cause of action for sexual har-
assment,14 stating: 
8.Id. 
It is undisputed that Capitol City had a policy 
against employee dating. Since Capitol City at-
9. Id. The trial court granted Burger King, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. 
Only Capitol City Foods, Inc. is a party to this appeal. Id. at 419 n.!. (The court's opin-
ion did not mention Mary's suit against Vernon or his parents.) 
10. Id. The other six causes of action were: (2) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; (3) misrepresentation; (4) promissory fraud; (5) negligent employment; (6) as-
sault and battery; and, (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff dismissed 
the seventh cause of action, and judgment on the pleading was granted as to the second 
and sixth causes of action. Id. at 420. Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judg-
ment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the issues on the remaining causes 
of action. The superior court granted the motion as to the third, fourth, and fifth causes 
of action and as to plaintiff's request for punitive damages. 
[d. 
11. Id. at 419. The primary factual allegation supporting this cause of action read: 
On January 31, 1989, defendant Johnson, in abusing his posi-
tion of authority as shift manager and supervisor of plaintiff 
Mary [T.], instructed plaintiff Mary [T.], who was dressed in 
her Burger King uniform and about to enter the premises. . . 
to report to her regularly assigned shift, to get into his car and 
accompany him to his residence. Defendant Johnson advised 
her that he had made arrangements so that she would not 
have to punch in on the time clock at work at that time. De-
fendant Johnson thereupon transported plaintiff Mary [T.] to 
his residence . . . and raped her. 
12. [d. at 420. Defendant asserted that under Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 72 (1986), agency principles should be applied in sexual harassment cases. 
13. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420. 
14. [d. 
4
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tempted to regulate off-premises activity and 
made it a part of its role as an employer, the 
court cannot find as a matter of law that violation 
of the rule is not foreseeable and not within the 
employment relationship. 15 
1045 
The court stated that the statutory scheme recognizing sexual 
harassment as a workplace hazardl6 broadened the analysis of 
[common law] agency; a different agency analysis is therefore 
used under the FEHA than under common law.17 The court 
stated that California Government Code section 12940, subdivi-
sion (h) imposes liability on an employer for the acts of an agent 
or supervisor, and Vernon's position as Mary's supervisor was 
undisputed. IS Capitol City petitioned the Third District Court of 
Appeal for a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior 
Court to set aside and vacate its order denying the motion for 
summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion in 
its entirety, or for an alternative writ ordering the trial court to 
take such action or show cause why the writ should not be 
granted.19 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer, or anyone 
acting as an agent of the employer, to harass an employee be-
cause of gender.20 Regulations promulgated under the FEHA in-
dicate that under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer 
is liable for harassment by supervisors, managers, or agents com-
mitted within the scope of employment or the relationship with 
the employer.21 Harassment is defined to include physical 
harassment.22 
15. Id. 
16. The court here is referring to the statutory scheme of the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900-40). 
17. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420. 
18.Id. 
19.Id. 
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE §12940(h) (West 1992). In contrast to harassment by a supervi-
sor, harassment by an employee other than a supervisor or an agent is unlawful only if 
the employer or the agent knows or should know of the conduct and fails to take imme-
diate corrective action. 
21. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.6 (b) (1992). 
22. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (b)(1)(B) (1992). 
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I. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Under a theory of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant was acting within the scope of his 
or her employment or as the defendant's agent. 23 Capitol City 
argued that before an employer can be held strictly liable for the 
harassing conduct of a supervisory employee, agency principles 
must first be applied.2• They contended that the trial court 
erred by "applying a broader concept of agency than that of the 
common law,211 and the court should have applied the agency 
analysis set forth in John R. u. Oakland Unified School Dis-
trict."26 Capitol City urged that the undisputed evidence re-
vealed an insufficient nexus between Vernon's conduct and his 
employment to permit the inference that his conduct arose in 
the course of his employment.27 Therefore, Capitol City asserted 
that the issue must be determined in the negative as a matter of 
law.28 However, Mary alleged that Vernon was acting under his 
authority as 'shift manager and supervisor at the time of the . 
harassment.29 
23. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula 
Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1989). (Respondeat superior is an element of a prima facie 
case of environmental sexual harassment.) 
24. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 421. 
25. Under common law agency principles, a master is liable 'for the torts of his ser-
vant if the servant was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of an agency 
relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219 (2)(d) (1958). 
Under this theory of agency, an employer may be liable when a supervisory em-
ployee uses the authority of his position to sexually harass another employee. Capitol 
City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422 n.2. 
26. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421 (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified 
School Dist., 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989)). In John R., the court set forth the general prin-
ciples of respondeat superior which holds an employer liable for the torts of its employ-
ees, committed within the scope of employment. 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 at 771. Whether an 
employer is acting within the scope of employment is generally a question of fact; how-
ever, if the undisputed evidence would not support an inference that the employee was 
acting within the scope of employment, it becomes a question of law. [d. The scope of 
employment is viewed broadly and may cover acts outside the ultimate object of employ-
ment; however, the employer is not liable if the employee substantially departs from his 
or her duties for purely personal reasons. 
. 27. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. Defendant points to the undisputed 
facts that Vernon was off duty during the incident, the parties agreed to the date, and 
there was no evidence Johnson used his authority as a supervisor to compel Mary's pres-
ence. She did not object to going with him and there was no evidence of coercion. [d. at 
421-22. 
28. [d. at 421. 
29. [d. at 422. 
6
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II. WORK-RELATED CONDUCT 
Precedential decisions of the' FEHC have recognized that 
while harassing conduct need not occur in the workplace, it must 
occur within a work-related context:30 
While the offending conduct may and often does 
occur at the place of work, it need not. Unwel-
come sexual conduct perpetrated by an agent, su-
pervisor, or co-worker, which occurs elsewhere but 
is in some fashion work-related constitutes sexual 
harassment within the meaning of the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act.31 
In determining whether sexually harassing conduct is work-re-
lated, the FEHC has applied common law principles.32 Mary had 
the burden of establishing that Vernon was acting within the 
scope of his employment.33 Attempting to show a, sufficient 
nexus, Mary pointed to the following: the "date" was arranged 
in Vernon's office; when Vernon met Mary and transported her 
to his parents' home, she was in her work uniform; and, Vernon 
exercised his authority to excuse Mary from work so that she 
could be with him, thereby, facilitating the rape. 3" However, the 
court stated that Mary's argument overlooked the fact that Cap-
itol City conclusively refuted the allegation' that Vernon forced 
Mary to accompany him or coerced her in any way prior to en-
tering his bedroom.36 In light of this refutation, the court held 
that Vernon's phone call to Burger King to excuse Mary from 
work was insufficient to support an inference that Vernon was 
acting within the scope of his employment or was acting as an 
30.Id. 
31. Id. (citing DFEH v Huncot Properties, FEHC Dec. No. 88-21, at 8 (Dec. 15, 
1988)). 
See, eg., DFEH v. Beehive Answering Service, FEHC (June 7, 1984) Dec. No. 84-16, 
at p.19 (where a supervisor exerted and exploited his authority to compel an employee's 
attendance at several meals away from the office, the use and abuse of his supervisory 
status was sufficient to bring his sexually harassing conduct outside of the workplace 
within the ambit of the Fair Employment and Housing Act). 
32. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 422-23. The court stated that the undisputed evidence negated Mary's 
allegations that Vernon abused his authority by instructing Mary to accompany him be-
cause the undisputed evidence showed that Mary agreed to meet and accompany 
Vernon. 
7
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agent of the defendant.36 
Capital City urged that there was an insufficient nexus be-
tween Vernon's conduct and his employment to hold Capital 
City liable for Vernon's acts. 37 The Court agreed with Capitol 
City and held that Mary failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support an inference that Vernon was acting within the scope of 
his employment or as an agent of Capital City when the harass-
ment occurred.38 Therefore, the Court issued a peremptory writ 
of mandate ordering the superior court to enter a new order 
granting Capital City's motion for summary judgment.39 
CRITIQUE 
Under a theory of respondeat superior, an employer shall 
not be held liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a co-
worker unless the supervisor is acting within the scope of his or 
her employment or acting as an agent of the employer."o Yet, 
from the court's opinion in this case, it is still unclear when the 
employer is liable for the actions of a supervisory employee, es-
pecially those taken outside the work setting;U Ironically, the 
Court did mention some cases dealing with sexual harassment 
occurring after hours but while still at the workplace. However, 
the court failed to take the opportunity to use those cases to 
recognize, discuss, and resolve the issue of sexual harassment 
outside of the workplace."2 
Only one thing is clear: a victim of sexual harassment has a 
heavy burden to carry when attempting to hold an employer lia-
ble for the conduct of a supervisory employee. This heavy bur-
36. [d. at 423. 
37. [d. at 421. 
38. [d. at 423. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 421. 
41. For example, when will an employer be held liable for a supervisory employee's 
sexually harassing conduct while at an office Christmas party or company picnic? 
42. See. e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975) cited in Cap-
itol City Foods. The court in Rodgers stated that an employer was liable for risks inher-
ent in or created by the enterprise. For social pursuits on the premises after work, an 
employer was liable if (1) it endorsed the activity by express or implied permission, and 
(2) the activity was conceivably of some benefit to the employer or was a customary 
incident of the employment relationship. 124 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
8
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den is clearly demonstrated in this case. Mary showed that 
Vernon used his supervisory authority to excuse her from work, 
and it was during this excused absence that Vernon sexually 
harassed Mary. However, in spite of this undisputed evidence, 
the court refused to find that Mary sustained her burden of 
proving that Vernon's actions were within the scope of his em-
ployment as a supervisor.43 
The imposition of such a heavy burden upon the victim of 
sexual harassment is detrimental to the victim as well as to 
other employees who are potential victims of sexual harassment. 
Many victims of sexual harassment will likely be intimidated by 
this heavy burden and decide not to pursue valid claims against 
their harassers. Additionally, supervisory employees can and will . 
continue to use their j9b-related power to gain non job-related 
control over other employees while avoiding criminal sanctions 
for their harassing behavior. 
"The strictest rules of liability are imposed on the employer 
and its supervisors. Their conduct is judged more harshly ... 
because of the inherent control those persons have over subordi-
nates who will comply with suggestions made by supervisors. . . 
for fear that refusal will affect their position in the organiza-
tion."44 However, the California Court of Appeal failed to apply 
these strict rules of liability in refusing to hold Capital City lia-
ble for Vernon's action of excusing Mary from work for the pur-
pose of raping her. In failing to hold Capital City liable for 
Vernon's actions, the California Court of Appeal sent a danger-
ous message to supervisors, telling them only that they should 
leave their place of employment before engaging in any harass-
ing conduct. This court did nothing but stir the already mud-
died waters regarding sexual harassment and then walk away 
leaving its audience with more questions than answers. 
Stephanie L. Bradshaw* 
43. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423. 
44. WENDY A. WOLDT, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
FOR EMPLOYERS 3 (1992). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of December 1993. 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
An employee terminated in retaliation for supporting a co-
worker's claim of sexual harassment may assert a cause of ac-
tion for tortious discharge in violation of public policy. 
Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
874, 824 P.2d 680 (1992). In Gantt, the California Supreme 
Court held that an employee terminated in retaliation for sup-
porting a co-worker's claim of sexual harassment may assert a 
cause of action for tortious discharge in contravention of public 
policy.l The court narrowly defined public policy as a claim 
based only on a constitutional or statutory provision;2 specifi-
cally relying on Government Code section 1297"5 which prohibits 
interference with an agency's investigation.3 In addition, the 
court held that the Workers' Compensation Act did not preempt 
such a cause of action because the actions of the employer did 
not fall within the employer-employee relationship.' 
FACTS 
Vincent A. Gantt, plaintiff, was a sales manager for Sentry 
Insurance ("Sentry") since 1979.11 Joyce Bruno, a co-worker of 
Mr. Gantt, reported to Mr. Gantt that she was being sexually 
harassed by one of her supervisors. a Mr. Gantt told Ms. Bruno 
to report the incident to higher management, but he eventually 
reported it himself as the harassment continued.7 After a meet-
ing at which Mr. Gantt was ridiculed for supporting her claims, 
Ms. Bruno was fired. s Subsequent to firing Ms. Bruno, the newly 
1. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 681-82. For a discussion regarding the scope of 
the public policy exception, see Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful 
Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983). 
2. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 681. 
3. Id. at 689 (citing CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12975 (West 1992)). 
4. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 690 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 1989)). 
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hired sales director said that firing Mr. Gantt was a priority.9 
Pursuant to Ms. Bruno's complaint with the California De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging 
sexual harassment,IO Sentry's house counsel investigated the 
complaint. ll Mr. Gantt testified to his belief that the house 
counsel wanted him to retract his claim of informing higher 
manageJIlent of the sexual harassment complaints. I2 In March, 
1983, less than two months after the investigation,I3 Mr. Gantt 
was demoted to sales representative and not given any existing 
accounts. 14 For the next month, Mr. Gantt was rarely in the of-
fice; he took vacation time and sick leave due to an illness. 111 He 
secured another position and left Sentry's payroll in May.I6 
Two months after leaving Sentry, Mr. Gantt filed a com-
plaint against Sentry and two particular employees alleging tor-
tious discharge in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and in contravention of public policy, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. I7 The jury returned a 
special verdict for Mr. Gantt. IS The Court of Appeal reversed 
the verdict with respect to the individual defendants, but af-
firmed the verdict against Sentry.I9 
Sentry petitioned the Supreme Court for review asserting 
that neither the facts nor the law supported plaintiff's claim.20 
9. [d. 
10. Gantt, 824 P.2d 682. Ms. Bruno alleged harassment by a Sentry Insurance em-
ployee and failure by Sentry's higher management to respond to the complaints. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 683. Additionally, Mr. Gantt was told by a co-worker that management 
did not care for him, and Mr. Gantt was informed by a memorandum that it appeared as 
if he were involved in an undercover operation. [d. at 682. 
13. [d. During the investigation, Mr. Gantt met privately with the DFEH investiga-
tor because the house counsel's actions worried him. The DFEH investigator assured him 
that there could be no retaliatory action against him. 
14. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 683. Mr. Gantt testified that an existing account book is 
necessary to perform as a sales representative. 
15. [d. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. at 681. 
18. [d. at 683. The jury specifically found that he was constructively discharged, 
that Sentry lacked a good faith belief that the termination was warranted for legally 
valid business reasons, and that Mr. Gantt was discharged in retaliation for his actions 
regarding Ms. Bruno's sexual harassment allegations. 
19. Id. at 681. 
20. [d. 
12
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In addition, defendant claimed that the Worker's Compensation 
Act barred Mr. Gantt's cause of action.21 The California Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appea1.22 
I. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
Historically, at-will employment was terminable by either 
party for any reason with reasonable notice.23 In recent years, 
certain exceptions, including the public policy exception, have 
evolved to protect job security.24 
The California Supreme Court first recognized the public 
policy exception to at-will employment in Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield CO.25 The Tameny court held that an at-will employee 
has a tort action when he or she is discharged for refusing to 
commit an act in violation of fundamental public policy.26 
The problem with defining public policy is discerning be-
tween actual public policy and normal employer-employee dis-
putes.27 In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,28 the court man-
dated that 'an issue pertain to society at large rather than a 
proprietary interest.29 Although the court did not specify 
whether this was to be based on a constitutional or statutory 
21. [d. 
22. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 682. 
23. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public 
Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931 (1983). 
24. [d. at 1934-35. Modifications and exceptions to the at-will rule include collective 
bargaining agreements prohibiting discharge without cause, the evolution of implied con-
tract terms applied to at-will employment, and a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
25. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). In Tameny, plain-
tiff, a sales representative in charge of independent service station relations for ARCO, 
alleged that defendant ARCO pressured him to get the dealers to set their prices as 
specified by ARCO in violation of the Sherman Act, Cartwright Act, and a specific con-
sent decree in a federal antitrust prosecution of defendant. [d. at 1330-32. Plaintiff was 
discharged for refusing to engage in this activity. [d. at 1330. The court held that this 
complaint stated a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge because the discharge is 
not based on a violation of a contractual provision. [d. at 1334-35. This court based its 
decision on Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959), 
which held there to be a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge. [d. at 1332-34. 
26. Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1337. 
27. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684. 
28. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
29. [d. at 378-79. 
13
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provision, the court offered guidelines suggesting that the policy 
had to be "fundamental," "substantial," and "well established" 
at the time of the discharge.3o 
However, few courts recognize the public policy exception 
within these guidelines and outside of a constitutional or statu-
tory provision.31 Examples of discharge in contravention of pub-
lic policy inolude refusing to violate a statute, performing a stat-
utory obligation, exercising a right or privilege, and reporting a 
violation.32 
The Gantt court declared the public policy exception to be 
limited to a constitutional or statutory provision33 reasoning that 
California courts have traditionally limited public policy to such 
provisions. 34 The court reasoned that this narrow definition 
maintains the proper balance between the intere~ts of employers 
and. employees. 311 The court also posited that limiting the public 
policy exception to constitutional or statutory provisions pre-
cludes judicial policymaking because the court may not declare 
public policy if the legislature has not specifically addressed it 
by statute.36 
B. ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
Sentry argued that supporting a co-workers claim of sexual 
harassment does not affect the public at large, but only the 
plaintiff, therefore, falling within a regular employer-employee 
30. [d. at 378-79. 
31. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684-85. The Wisconsin Supreme Court takes a narrow view 
and limits plaintiffs to contract damages based on only statutory or constitutional provi-
sions. The Kentucky Supreme Court also limits the public policy exception to a statutory 
or constitutional provision. Texas, South Carolina, and Washington, DC, have also 
adopted similar restrictive definitions. The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a 
broader view and recognizes a tort action for discharge in contravention of public policy 
which includes legislation, administrative rules, regulations, judicial decisions, and a pro-
fessional code of ethics. 
32. [d. at 684. 
33. Id. at 687. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 688. The employer is limited by statutory and constitutional provisions 
and will not be liable for other activities that might be against public policy, while the 
employee has redress for issues arising under statutes or the constitution. 
36. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687. 
14
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dispute. 37 Mr. Gantt claimed that his discharge should fall under 
the public policy exception because it could be construed as aris-
ing under the California constitutional provision prohibiting sex-
ual discrimination.3s 
The California Supreme Court in Gantt, however, was not 
asked to declare whether being fired in retaliation for supporting 
a co-workers claim of sexual harassment is against public policy, 
but instead, whether there was a clear constitutional or statutory 
provision of fundamental public policy prohibiting Mr. Gantt's 
. discharge.39 The court cited California Government Code section 
12975 which specifically enjoins any interference with an agency 
investigation.40 This decision falls within the precedent of 
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield CoY and Petermann v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters. 42 Both cases rely on statutory author-
ity without specifically addressing the definition of public policy 
outside a statutory or constitutional provision.43 The Gantt 
court addresses the definition of public policy by limiting it to 
either a constitutional or statutory provision." 
C. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT 
CLAIM 
Sentry maintains that suing for tortious discharge in contra-
vention of public policy is preempted by the Workers' Compen-
sation Act's exclusive remedy provisions.41i However, claims aris-
37. [d. at 688. 
38. CAL. CONST. art. I § 8. See also Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688. Mr. Gantt asserted that 
the constitutional provision prohibiting sexual discrimination also demands a workplace 
free from the repercussions of sexual harassment. 
39. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688. 
40. [d. at 689. This code section is part of the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act. 
41. Tameny, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee could not be discharged for refus· 
ing to violate a statute). 
42. Petermann, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (employer liable for discharging employee 
because he refused to testify falsely before a legislative committee). 
43. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688. 
44. [d. at 687. The court admits that it is not being asked to declare public policy. 
Although the court defines public policy in this decision, that language is dicta since the 
court based its decision on a statutory violation. [d. at 688. 
45. [d. at 689·90. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989) (Workers' Compensation 
Act) which provides that compensation as provided in the act is the sole and exclusive 
remedy of the employee. 
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ing under a Tameny theory are not preempted46 because 
preemption only occurs if the claim arises out of and in the 
course of employment.47 
Under the facts in Gantt, the court held that interfering 
with an agency investigation in violation of Government Code 
section 12975 is not within the proper role of the employer.48 
The Gantt decision addresses the public interest of not allowing 
employers to impose conditions on an employee which violate 
public policy.49 
DISSENT 
Although her dissent agrees with the outcome of the case, 
Justice Kennard focuses on the majority's definition of public 
policy.lio Justice Kennard finds that the court overstepped its 
boundaries by defining public policy at all because there was a 
narrow government code on point under which this case could 
have been decided. iiI 
In addition, the dissent posits that the public policy defini-
tion is too narrow because there are other legitimate sources of 
public policy.1i2 
CRITIQUE 
The holding in Gantt, allowing a cause of action for a co-
worker fired in retaliation for supporting a claim of sexual har-
assment, will hopefully result in employees being more willing to 
46. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 690. 
47. [d. at 690-91 (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 
1987» (exclusive remedy provisions are not applicable under circumstances where the 
employer stepped out of the proper role). 
48. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 691. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 692. 
51. [d. at 693 .. 
52. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 694. The dissent cites Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Con-
vair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Cal. 1990) as an example of other legitimate sources of 
public policy. A production supervisor for a national defense project was fired for com-
plaining that security was too lax. [d. at 560. The court held that this discharge was in 
violation to a fundamental public interest. [d. at 562. Under the majority's strict defini-
tion of public policy, this employee will no longer have redress. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684. 
16
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support a co-worker's sexual harassment claim. However, the 
court should have applied a broader definition of tortious dis-
charge in contravention of public policy in order to allow redress 
for many situations not addressed under a statute or constitu-
tional provision. 
Other state courts have defined additional sources of public 
policy. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, public pol-
icy includes: legislation, administrative rules, regulations or deci-
sions, judicial decisions, and a professional code of ethics.1I3 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the judiciary is to decide 
on a case by case basis and balance the interests of the em-
ployee, the employer, and the public.1!4 This broad definition of 
public policy allows the court to define the cause of action as 
necessary to protect the interests involved. 
Under California's narrow definition of public policy limit-
ing its sources to statutes and the constitution, some employees 
may be without redress. Such an exclusion may include a co-
worker who is constructively discharged for supporting a co-
worker's sexual harassment claim when the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing is not conducting an investigation. 
In Gantt, the California Supreme Court finally defined the 
scope of the public policy exception to at-will employment. 1I1I Al-
though too narrow to encourage employees without specific con-
stitutional or statutory authority to demand redress for possible 
wrongful discharge, the holding in Gantt allows some employees 
53. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). Not everything 
is considered a source of public policy by the New Jersey Supreme Court. For example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court points to the Hippocratic oath as an insufficient source 
of public policy. [d. at 514. The doctor, an employee at will did not have a cause of 
action against her employer to recover for damages for the termination of her employ-
ment following her refusal to continue a project she viewed as medically unethical. [d. at 
508. The dissent points to a medical code of ethics that should have been used as a 
source of public policy. [d. at 514. 
54. [d. at 512. Employees have an interest in not being discharged for exercising 
their legal rights. [d. at 511. Employers have an interest in running their businesses as 
they see fit. The public has an interest in employment stability. 
55. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687. 
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to support a co-worker's sexual harassment claim without fear of 
discharge. 
Alexandra D'Italia* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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TORT LAW 
The mother and brother of a man who shot and killed his wife 
are not negligent for failing to protect 'or warn her. 
Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 (1992). In Hansra 
v. Superior Court,I the California Court of Appeal held that a 
husband's mother and brother were under no duty to control 
him or to protect his wife whom he shot and killed. The court 
concluded that the husband's murder of his wife was not reason-
ably foreseeable and therefore refused to impose a legal duty of 
care upon defendants.2 
FACTS 
On April 12, 1989, Joginder Hansra killed his wife, Juanita, 
and then killed himself.s Juanita had previously told Joginder 
that she planned to terminate the marriage. Joginder reacted 
with anxiety, depression, and hostility towards her, all of which 
he expressed to defendants.· Joginder also told defendants that 
he would prevent Juanita's departure by any means at his 
disposal. lI 
Joginder Hansra had a history of mental and emotional in-
stability and was undergoing mental health treatment until the 
time of the murder.6 He had previously been disciplined at work 
for threatening fellow employees with physical violence.7 Fur-
thermore, police officers had on earlier occasions removed weap-
ons from Joginder's custody and control. 
Plaintiffs8 first argued that defendants should be held liable 
1. Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 216 (1992). 
2. Id. at 226. 
3: Id. at 218. 
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on a theory of general negligence, since their conduct created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the defendant.9 Relying on Pamela 
L. v. Farmer, lO plaintiffs distinguished nonfeasance from misfea-
sance, arguing that the defendants were actively involved in cre~ 
ating and maintaining Joginder's animosity towards Juanita 
which foresee ably increased the risk of harm to her.II In support 
of this contention, the plaintiffs pointed to several acts of the 
defendants: Joginder's mother and brother convinced him to 
divest himself of his interest in the family orchard operation 
prior to marriage; they persuaded Joginder to condition visita-
tion between Juanita's children and their father upon payment 
of child support; and they spoke derogatorily of Juanita to 
Joginder.I2 
As a second theory, plaintiffs argued there was a "special 
relationship" between 1) Juanita and defendants and 2) 
Joginder and defendants, giving rise to a duty to protect her 
from Joginder's violent outbursts. I3 Plaintiffs proposed that 
these relationships gave rise to a duty of care independent of the 
duty existing by reason of defendants' conduct.14 
Defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint by asserting that 
plaintiffs had no viable claim. III Thereafter, defendants moved 
for summary judgment. IS The trial court denied the motion, 
stating that defendants had failed to controvert the allegations 
in plaintiffs' complaint.n Defendants petitioned the Court of 
Appeal for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to grant 
their motion. IS Defendants contended that an appeal from a fi-
9. [d. at 221. 
10. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). In Pamela L. the court found a 
woman negligent for inviting teenage girls to her home when she knew her husband had 
molested women and children in the past. The court held that while a person generally 
has no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those endangered by such 
conduct, this will not apply where the defendant's conduct has made the plaintiff's posi-
tion worse, thereby creating a foreseeable risk of harm to the third person. In such cases, 
the standard of ordinary care will apply. 
11. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222. 
12. [d. at 219. 
13. [d. at 224. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. at 219. 
16. [d. 
17. Id. at 220. 
18. [d. 
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nal judgment would be an insufficient remedy since plaintiffs' 




Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure section 
1086, the court examined whether an appeal from the judgment 
would be an adequate remedy for defendants.2o The court found 
that plaintiffs had no cognizable claim and therefore agreed with 
defendants that a preemptory writ ordering the court to dismiss 
the case was a necessary remedy to avoid a needless and waste-
ful trial,21 Accordingly, the court treated defendants' motion as 
one for judgment on the pleadings and issued a preemptory writ 
of mandate directing the trial court to grant the motion for sum-
mary judgment.22 ' 
II. GENERAL NEGLIGENCE 
In determining whether to impose a duty of care, the Han-
sra court first set out the factors to consider as established by 
Rowland v. Christian. 23 These factors are the following: 
19. Id. 
(1) foreseeability of harm, 
(2) degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, 
(3) closeness of connection between defendant's 
conduct and injury suffered, 
(4) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, 
(5) the policy of preventing future harm, 
(6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community for imposing lia-
bility, and 
(7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insur-
ance for the risk involved. 
20. CAL. CIY. CODE § 1086 (West 1980). 
21. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220. 
22. Id. at 218. 
23. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
21
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Ultimately the Hansra court concluded that the single most im-
portant factor, foreseeability of the harm, was not present and 
thus foreclosed liability.24 The court found plaintiffs' 'reliance on 
Pamela L. misplaced and defendants' reliance on Wise v. Supe-
rior Court 2G -more applicable. The court noted that defendants' 
conduct did not create a foreseeable risk of harm to the plain-
tiffs unlike the defendants' conduct in Pamela L. Rather, the 
court pointed out that defendants' derogation of Juanita would 
foreseeably result in dissolution of marriage, not murder.26 
III. NEGLIGENCE BASED ON "SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP" 
As support for their second theory, plaintiffs reli~d on 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California which estab-
lished that an affirmative duty to warn could arise from the exis-
tence of a "special relationship."27 
Plaintiffs proposed two sets of "special relationships." The 
first relationship was based on the familial ties between Joginder 
and the defendants which according to plaintiffs established a 
duty to control Joginder. Th'e second relationship was between 
the defendants and Juanita through her marriage to Joginder. 
Plaintiffs claimed this relationship created a duty to warn 
Juanita of Joginder's violent intentions.28 The court rejected 
both arguments stating that no facts suggested that defendants 
actually had an ability to control Joginder.29 Furthermore, the 
court pointed out that merely alleging a "special relationship" 
did not create liability absent foreseeability of harm.30 In fact, 
24. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. 
25. Wise v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990). In Wise, the court refused to 
impose liability on the wife of a sniper who shot the plaintiff. The court found that the 
wife took no action which made the victim's position worse or created a foreseeable risk 
of harm. Specifically, the wife did not assist her husband in any way nor could she fore-
see this type of harm (sniper attack) to an identifiable victim (passing motorist). 
26. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. 
27. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976). In 
Tarasoff, the court held that the "special relationship" between therapist and client sup-
ported imposing an affirmative duty on the therapist to protect third parties foreseeably 
harmed by the client. 
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the same factors used to establish a duty of care31 were neces-
sary to establish a "special relationship."32 Ultimately, the court 
found that the "special relationship" theory was indistinguish-
able from the general negligence theory, since a lack of foresee-
ability was fatal to both of these claims.33 
CRITIQUE 
After determining that the same policy considerations from 
Rowland 34 underlie both claims, the court applied its conclu-
sions from the general negligence claim to the "special relation-
ship" theory. However, without a separate discussion of the sec-
ond claim, the court's holding is based on an incomplete 
analysis. Although the same factors from Rowland are applied to 
each claim, separate inquiries arise. For the general negligence 
claim, the relevant issue is whether defendants' conduct of deni-
grating Juanita created a foreseeable risk of physical harm to 
her. However, for the claim based on a "special relationship", 
the relevant issue is whether, based on defendants' knowledge of 
Joginder's violent propensities, their failure"to warn Juanita cre-
ated a foreseeable risk of harm to her. Ultimately the court fo-
cused its causation analysis mainly on defendants' active con-
duct and therefore only gave passing consideration to the 
remaining Rowland factors. 
A full analysis of the essential policy considerations set 
forth in Rowland will reveal that the decision not to impose lia-
bility under the "special relationship" theory was more likely 
based on a compilation of all factors rather than foreseeability 
alone. These essential factors include: 1) foreseeability of harm 
to plaintiff and closeness of connection between defendants' con-
duct and the injury suffered; 2) the moral blame attached to de-
fendants' conduct; and 3) the policy of preventing future harm 
and the extent of the burden to defendant as well as the conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty of care.311 
31. See supra note 23. 
32. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227. 
33.Id. 
34. See supra note 23. 
35. Two factors, degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury and the cost and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved are not discussed here as neither warrants 
considerable analysis. Certain factors have been combined because they fall under the 
23
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With reference to foreseeability, the court aptly concluded 
that defendants' conduct of derogating Juanita would 
foreseeably result in dissolution of marriage, not murder. The 
court then briefly considered defendants' failure to warn, and 
with reference to defendants' knowledge stated, "the allegations 
also fail to suggest that Joginder's hostility was ever directed at 
Juanita, who was the object of his desire."36 Therefore, because 
no evidence existed that Joginder had previously harmed 
Juanita, the court concluded defendants could not foresee 
Joginder's actions. However, given his history of violence com-
bined with his recent threats, which he expressed to defendants, 
to prevent Juanita's departure by any means, the court's conclu-
sion is almost disingenuous. In fact, the court's statement also 
suggests that because Juanita was the object of Joginder's affec-
tions, she would be an unlikely target of his violence. Given that 
thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their 
male partners; this conclusion is flawed. 37 However, perhaps 
Juanita herself knew about Joginder's propensity for violence, 
and thus the court considered her sufficiently forewarned. 
It is also possible that the court's expectations are different 
for family members and "lay people" than professional counsel-
ors. Arguably the professional is better qualified to predict fu-
ture violence.38 Such reasoning may help to explain why the 
claim against Joginder's family was dismissed yet the claim 
against the mental health workers still remains. 
Upon application of the second factor, moral blame at-
tached to defendants' conduct, the court stated," [T]he allega-
tions of the complaint, if true, would justify moral blame for de-
fendants' treatment of both decedents. Fundamental policy 
promotes marriage and the sanctity of the marital relationship. 
same broader heading, i.e. "causation." 
36. Hansra, 9 Cal. ·Rptr. 2d at 223. 
37. Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990). 
38. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociole-
gal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. I (1988). Professor Rabin suggests that extension of the 
affirmative duty principle is based on the notion that the "activity provider" is better 
positioned to act as an accident preventer or "risk spreader." But see, Tarasoff, supra 
note 27, in which the American Psychiatric Association asserted, based on research, that 
therapists' forecasts of violence are more often wrong than right. 
24
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However, because of the lack of a close connection between de-
fendants' conduct and Joginder's lethal attack ... this factor 
weighs only marginally in plaintiffs' favor."39 (emphasis added). 
The court thus concluded that defendants' active conduct of 
derogating Juanita was morally reprehensible in that it could 
lead to marital discord. However, the court never examined the 
moral blame attached to defendants' lack of conduct (failure to 
warn) in light of their knowledge about Joginder. If both claims 
were analyzed under the Rowland factors then it is this lack of 
conduct which is the relevant issue for the "special relationship" 
claim. Understanding this, the foreseeable outcome of defend-
ants' failure to warn would be quite different. Defendants' fail-
ure to warn Juanita would not encourage "marital discord"; 
rather, it would allow Joginder's violence, uninterrupted, to 
bring physical harm, or even death, to his wife. 
An unconditional policy favoring marital sanctity creates a 
tension between the court's analysis of both claims. In the case 
of defendants' active derogation of Juanita, the court con-
demned defendants' interference for promoting marital discord 
which might lead to divorce. Conversely, in evaluating defend-
ants' failure to warn, it is precisely their lack of interference 
which is deserving of moral blame. This raises the issue of when 
family privacy should be "sacrificed" in the name of public pol-
icy. The court did not address this question, but instead let 
stand an analysis which promotes a traditional patriarchal fam-
ily structure where women may be victimized without outside 
intervention.40 A full analysis of both claims would have pro-
vided greater insight into the underlying values motivating the 
decision. 
The court next examined the policy of preventing future 
harm and the extent to which defendants would be burdened by 
the imposition of liability, and determined that the burden of 
notifying the potential victim was slight. However, the court also 
39. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224. 
40. While to some readers these observations' may appear far-reaching, the court's 
unqualified support for marital sanctity, in the case of spousal murder, is suspect. This is 
particularly notable given that in the past when courts were reluctant to punish hus-
bands for spousal abuse, justices based their decisions on the desire to maintain the 
"unity of spouses." For a thorough discussion on this topic, see, R. EMERSON DOBASH. 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979). 
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concluded that the consequences to the community of imposing 
liability were high when compared to the benefits, which the 
court dismissed as speculative. 
If Juanita's death was found to be the foreseeable result of 
defendants' inaction, then a finding of liability would be a pow-
erful incentive for those aware of the danger to communicate 
their knowledge to potential victims. A simple warning, given by 
those most likely to witness the danger signals, would be an easy 
way to avoid liability and result in a tremendous benefit to the 
community at large. On the other hand, the court's determina-
tion that this is a heavy burden may reflect the belief that plac-
ing liability on family members for not protecting each other is 
inappropriate. Family members are not detached professionals 
but rather invested members of an intimate structure resulting 
in psychological and emotional barriers. Barriers such as denial, 
for example, could prevent their clear, unhindered foresight. 4 } 
Given the prevalence of spousal violence, a more thorough 
analysis of these issues is imperative to guide future courts in 
their decisions. ' 
CONCLUSION 
The outcome of this case is consistent with the judicial sys-
tem's reluctance to impose liability on a third party for the 
criminal conduct of another.42 However, in deciding whether to 
impose a duty of care, the court relied on an oversimplified anal-
ysis of foreseeability and neglected other policy considerations. 
If the court applied the Rowland factors to both claims, it 
should have adapted them to the relevant inquiries for each 
claim rather than merely transferring the conclusions from one 
41. One example is Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980), which raised this 
issue by placing liability on the wife of a sexual molestor. The profound denial existing 
in families where one member is a sexual perpetrator raises serious doubts as to any 
deterrence value a lawsuit could have. See, Phillip Madonna, Susan Van Scoyk & David 
P.H. Jones, Family Interactions Within Incest and Non-Incest Families, 5 AMER. J. OF 
FAM. LAW 251 (1991) which found that "a striking finding was the extent of distortion 
and incongruence in the belief systems of incest families." 
42. Note, Affirmatiue Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1013 (1983). The 
author suggests that, despite contrary expectations, California courts have not deviated 
from the spirit of the common law practice. Rather, courts remain rell)ctant to extend 
the concept of affirmative duty. 
26
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claim to the other. In its streamlined analysis, the court ob-
scured the complex value judgments underlying the decision. 
Asha Khosla* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
Evidence of a defendant's cultural background is relevant in 
determining the presence or absence of the mental states of a 
crime. 
People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991). In People v. Wu, 
the California Court of Appeal held the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in refusing to issue jury instructions relating to 
the defense of unconsciousness;l and ruled that the defendant 
was entitled to have jury instructions on the effect defendant's 
cultural background2 had on her state of mind at the time she 
killed her son.3 
FACTS 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant, Helen Wu,' was born in Saigon, China in 1943.1) 
At age nineteen, Helen moved to Macau, got married and had a 
daughter.6 In 1963, Helen met Gary Wu, the son of one of her 
friends.7 Shortly thereafter, Gary moved to the United States 
and was married.8 Helen remained in Macau and was divorced 
after eight years of marriage.s In the mid-1970's, Helen was 
again engaged to be married, but her fiance died.1o 
In 1978 or 1979, Gary contacted Helen because he heard she 
was divorced and had a child. 11 Gary was not happy with his 
1. Hereinafter referred to as the unconsciousness defense. 
2. Hereinafter referred to as the cultural background defense. 
3. People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 887 (1991). 
4. Also known as Helen Hamg Ieng Chau. 





10. Helen's fiance's sister, Nancy Chung, became Helen's close friend. Helen's fiance 
made Nancy promise to help Helen because she was a kind, moral person, who was not 
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marriage because his wife could not have children, and they dis-
cussed the possibility of Helen coming to the United States to 
bear his child. 12 
Gary gave Helen $20,000 to apply for a visa and in Novem-
ber, 1979, Helen came to the United States.1S Gary assured 
Helen that once his divorce was final, he would definitely marry 
her. 14 . 
By January, 1980, Gary was divorced, but he did not tell 
Helen. 111 Helen became pregnant by Gary in early 1980 and 
moved to her own apartment, where Gary would visit her.16 
Their son, Sidney, was born in November, 1980, but Gary still 
had not proposed marriage,u Helen became depressed about her 
situation, especially because she could not speak English, could 
not drive and had no support system in the United States.18 
Helen told Gary she intended to move back to Macau.19 
Finally, in 1981, Helen returned to Macau.2o She left Sidney 
with Gary because Sidney was born out of wedlock and, in 
China, she and Sidney would be shamed and humiliated.21 
For the next six years, Helen regularly asked Gary to bring 
Sidney to visit her.22 In September, 1987, Gary needed money 
and Helen told him she would loan him the money if he brought 
Sidney to visit her.2s Helen did not have the money to loan 
Gary, so she borrowed $100,000 in cash and a receipt for a certif-
icate of deposit for a million Hong Kong dollars.24 In January 
12. Helen was in love with Gary and believed he would marry her after he divorced 
his wife. [d. 
13. When Helen arrived, Gary hugged and kissed her. [d. 
14. After Helen's arrival in the United States, she lived with Gary's mother. [d. at 
870-71. 




19. Helen expected Gary to try to persuade her to stay, but he did not do so. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. In Chinese culture, children born out of wedlock are frowned upon. Therefore, 
the only person in China who knew about Sidney was Nancy. [d. 
22. In 1984, Gary asked Helen to visit the United States, but she refused. She felt 
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1988, Gary took Sidney to visit Helen.211 Helen showed the cash 
and receipt to Gary and he proposed marriage.26 She refused be-
cause she felt the proposal was only because of her money.27 Ad-
ditionally, she did not know if Gary was still married.28 
In August 1989, Helen came to the United States and vis-
ited Gary's mother, who was terminally ill.29 Gary's mother, who 
took care of Sidney, told Helen that when she died, Helen 
should take Sidney because Gary would not take good care of 
him.30 Gary's cousin Sandy gave Helen similar advice.3} 
At the end of August, Gary told Helen they were going to be 
married.32 On September 1, 1989, they were married.33 Helen 
still thought Gary had married her for her money and expressed 
her doubts to Gary.3ol When Helen asked whether the marriage 
was worthwhile simply to legitimize Sidney, Gary replied that 
many people could give him children.311 Helen told Gary he 
would be sorry.36 She then decided to return to Macau.37 
II. THE INCIDENT 
On September 9, 1989, Helen and eight-year old Sidney 
were talking when Sidney told her that Gary called Helen 
"psychotic" and "very troublesome."38 Sidney told Helen about 
Gary's girlfriend, Rosemary, and said that Gary loved Rosemary 




28. This situation depressed Helen, and she attempted to throw herself out of a 
window of an apartment, but Nancy stopped her. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. at 871-72. 
31. [d. at 872. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. When Helen asked him about this, Gary told her she had no right to speak until 
she produced the money. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. Helen later explained this comment meant that she was going to Macau and 
kill herself. [d. 
37. When Helen told Gary she was leaving, he asked if she was going to get the 
money for him. [d. 
38. [d. 
39. Sidney told Helen that Gary made Sidney get up early so Gary could take Rose-
31
et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
1072 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1069 
Helen thought about what Sidney's grandmother and cousin 
told her about Gary's care for Sidney.40 She began having heart 
palpitations and breathing difficulties, at which time Helen told 
Sidney she wanted to die and asked him if he would go with her 
to the other life. 41 
Helen left the bedroom, cut a piece of rope, went back into 
the bedroom and strangled Sidney:u She left a note for Gary 
and tried to strangle herself, but when that failed, she went to 
the kitchen, slashed her wrist with a knife, went back to the 
bedroom and lay down with Sidney.43 Gary came home and 
found Helen and Sidney.44 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Helen Wu was convicted of second degree murder.4Ci Her 
motion for a new trial was denied and she was sentenced to a 
prison term of fifteen years to life.46 She appealed contending 
reversible error for the refusal to issue two jury instructions on: 
(1) unconsciousness defense," and (2) cultural background 
mary's daughters to school in the morning and, if Sidney did not get up, Gary would 
scold and beat him. Also, earlier in the day, Helen intervened when Gary hit Sidney 
because he would not get out of the car. [d. 
40. [d. 




45. [d. at 869. 
46. [d. 
47. Helen's proposed jury instructions on unconsciousness stated: 
A person who commits what would otherwise be a crimi-
nal act, while unconscious, is not guilty of a crime. 
This rule of law applies to persons who are not conscious 
of acting but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering 
from a delirium of fever, or because of an attack of [psycho-
motor) epilepsy, a blow to the head, the involuntary taking of 
drugs or the involuntary consumption of intoxicating liquor, or 
any similar cause. 
Unconsciousness does not require that a person be inca-
pable of movement. 
Evidence has been received which may tend to show that 
the defendant was unconscious at the time and place of the 
commission of the alleged crime for which [she) is here on 
trial. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you have rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was conscious at the time 
the alleged crime was committed, [she) must be found not 
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defense.4s 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
I. UNCONSCIOUSNESS DEFENSE 
The court first discussed the unconsciousness defense49 and 
its application to the facts of the case. After examining the testi-
mony of several witnesses, the court determined there was 
enough evidence to warrant the unconsciousness instruction. 50 
The court found that the trial court committed reversible error 
in refusing to issue the unconsciousness instruction. III 
II. CULTURAL BACKGROUND DEFENSE 
A. PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENTS 
The court began by addressing the prosecution's five argu-
ments against the cultural background defense.1i2 First, the court 
dismissed two of the prosecution arguments that "evidence that 
defendant had values and motives of a traditional Chinese 
mother was contradicted by the evidence,"1i3 and "the prosecu-
tion's expert noted that nothing in Chinese culture or religion 
encouraged filicide."1i4 The court noted than an appropriate in-
struction can still be given even when there is a conflict in 
evidence.1i1i 
guilty. 
(CALJIC No. 4.30.) Id. at 873. 
48. Helen's proposed jury instruction on the cultural defense stated: 
You have received evidence of defendant's cultural back-
ground and the relationship of her culture to her mental state. 
You may, but are not required to, consider that the [sic) evi-
dence in determining the presence or absence of the essential 
mental states of the crimes defined in these instructions, or in 
determining any other issue in this case. 
Id. at 879-80. 
49. If a person is not conscious of acting during the commission of a crime, he or she 
may raise the unconsciousness defense. 
50. Id. at 874. 
51. Id. at 879. 
52. The cultural background defense, as used herein, may be raised when a criminal 
defendant's cultural background may be considered to determine his or her mental state 
or any other issue in the case. 
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Next, the prosecution argued that the instruction directed 
the jury's attention to particular testimony, which is prohib-
ited.lis The court also dismissed this argument, noting that the 
jury's attention is directed to conflicting evidence which related 
to the prosecution's theory of revenge and Helen's theory of the 
impact of her cultural background had· on her state of mind.1i7 
The prosecution then argued that "[n]either an awareness 
of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulat-
ing society nor acting despite such awareness is included within 
the definition of malice required for murder."118 This argument 
also failed, inasmuch as Helen did not argue that she was una-
ware of the laws controlling society or that she acted with or 
without regard for these laws.1i9 
Lastly, the prosecution opposed the specific cultural back-
ground defense by arguing there already were sufficient instruc-
tions given to cover that defense.so They listed various jury in-
structions relating to murder, manslaughter, heat of passion, and 
involuntary manslaughter.s1 The court stated that none of the 
instructions tell the jury that evidence of defendant's cultural 
background may be considered in relation to her murder 
charge.s2 
None of the prosecution's arguments were sufficient to show 
that the trial court properly refused to give the cultural back-
ground instruction.6s However, both the prosecution and trial 
court apparently believed they should not give the instruction 
because there was no appellate law on this subject.s• 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at 881. 
58. Id. at 880. 
59. Id. at 881. 
60. [d. at 880. 
61. Id. at 881. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 882. 
64.Id. 
The California Supreme Court held that California courts 
"have often approved instructions pointing out the relevance 
of certain kinds of evidence to 'a specific issue [citation)," and 
that lack of motive, lack of furtiveness, and the defendant's 
relationship with his victims were all relevant on the issue of 
premeditation and deliberation, and that "no reason appears 
why a defendant upon request should not be entitled to a spe-
34
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B. CULTURAL BACKGROUND JURY INSTRUCTION AS A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
Next, the court considered whether the instruction on cul-
tural background should have been refused for reasons other 
than those raised by the prosecution. The court turned to the 
issue of whether the jury could properly consider evidence of 
Helen's cultural background in determining the presence or ab-
sence of the "essential mental states of the crimes defined in 
these instructions, or in determining any other issue in this 
case."611 
The court found that evidence of Helen's cultural back-
ground was relevant to the issues of premeditation and delibera-
tion.66 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of statements 
Helen made days before the killing,67 and argued that they 
showed she planned to kill Sidney and take revenge on Gary.68 
The defense argued that Helen's cultural background offered an-
other explanation for her statements as well as a motive for the 
killing.s9 
The court also determined that evidence of Helen's cultural 
background was relevant to the issue of malice aforethought and 
the heat of passion defense.7o Heat of passion can be brought on 
cific instruction pointing out that" such circumstances might 
be considered by the jury on the issues of premeditation and 
deliberation. 
[d. at 882 citing People v. Sears, 465 P.2d 847, 853-54 (Cal. 1970). 
65. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83. The mental states at issue were (l) premeditation 
and deliberation, (2) malice aforethought, and (3) specific intent to kill. 
66. [d. at 883. 
67. For example, Helen told Gary "he would be sorry." Id. at 872. 
68. Id. at 883. 
69. When Helen told Gary he would be sorry, she meant she was thinking about 
returning to Macau and killing herself because of the strong disapproval of having a 
child out of wedlock. As for motive, the killing occurred immediately after Helen learned 
that Sidney was not loved by Gary and was treated badly. Helen's motive was to protect 
Sidney from ill-treatment in the future by caring for him in the afterlife. [d. 
70. [d. A defendant must be under the influence of a strong passion which would 
render an ordinary person to act rashly and without deliberation, and to act from pas-
sion rather than judgment. People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d I, 11 (Cal. 1946). A person need 
not act in rage or anger, but any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion 
would qualify. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884 citing People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 
1958). 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. There are 
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by a series of events over a considerable period of time71 which 
cause a person to be under the influence of "pre-existing 
stress. "72 
In her relationship with Gary, Helen experienced a series of 
events over a ten year period which caused her great anxiety and 
stress.73 Her cultural background could explain the source of the 
stress and how Sidney's statements to her immediately preced-
ing the killing could have constituted sufficient provocation to 
kill her son in the heat of passion.74 This evidence was relevant 
in determining Helen's mental and emotional state at the time 
of the killing. . 
Dr. Chien explained the Chinese belief in the afterlife, and 
testified that Helen thought she could do nothing but bring Sid-
ney with her to the other life after death.75 Because of the strong 
cultural expectation that a mother care for her child, Dr. Chien 
also testified that Helen thought she was doing this out of a 
mother's love and responsibility for her child.76 
Dr. Gock testified that Helen's response to her situation was 
culturally determined.77 When she learned that Gary was neither 
three kinds: (a) Voluntary - upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (b) Involuntary 
- .... (c) Vehicular - .... CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988). 
71. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884 citing Borchers, 325 P.2d at 102. 
72. The effect of "a series of events over a period of time" may be that the defend-
ant, just before the provoking incident, is under "pre-existing stress." Wu at 884 n.4 
citing People v. Pacheco, 172 Cal. Rptr. 269, 274 (1981). 
73. Wu at 884. 
74. The court relied on Dr. Chien and Dr. Gock's testimony to explain the source of 
the stress. [d. at 884-86. 
75. Id. at 885. By this time, Helen had decided that she was going to commit sui-
cide. She felt that Sidney was unwanted by his father and was being mistreated because 
he was born out of wedlock. This realization, together with the fact that his grandmother 
would not be able to care for him in the future, caused Helen to feel trapped, so she 
thought she should take him to heaven with her. [d. 
[d. 
76. According to Dr. Chien, 
Helen had an extreme guilt feeling because her son was un-
wanted, she couldn't fulfill her duties to her son and was wor-
ried about what would happen to him. In Asian culture, if the 
mother commits suicide and leaves her child alone, it is con-
sidered totally irresponsible behavior, especially because no 
one could provide real love like a mother. 
77. "It is very difficult to divorce ourselves from our culture and act in a totally 
culturally different way. And so, you know, she in many ways is a product of her past 
experiences, including her culture." [d. at 886. 
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taking care of Sidney nor providing paternal love, the only op-
tion she felt was available to her was to kill herself and take her 
son with her to the other world, where she could devote herself 
to taking care of Sidney.78 
The court concluded that the cultural background instruc-
tion was proper in this case and found that upon retrial, Helen 
would be entitled to have the instruction given to the jury.79 The 
court reversed the judgment because the trial court failed to give 
the unconsciousness instruction and therefore did not decide if 
Helen was prejudiced by the failure to give the cultural back-
ground instruction.80 
CRITIQUE 
Wu appears to be one of the first cases where cultural back-
ground was raised as a legitimate defense to a criminal charge. 
Although it has been raised in other cases, it has not always 
been successful. 81 
The cultural background defense was raised in a California 
Superior Court case entitled People v. Croy.82 Patrick "Hooty" 
Croy, a Karuk-Shasta Indian, was convicted of murdering a po-
lice officer and was acquitted after raising the defense.83 
78. Dr. Gock emphasized that Helen's purpose was benevolent, even though it may 
sound implausible to those raised in another culture. Helen did not see it as a killing, but 
rather that through death they could be reunited and she could provide the care for her 
son that he was not getting in this world. Id. 
79. Id. at 887. 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., People of New York v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998, (N.Y. 1986). In 
Aphaylath, a Laotian refugee, in a jealous rage, repeatedly stabbed his wife after she 
received a phone call from a former boyfriend. Testimony regarding Laotian culture was 
excluded because the witness had not evaluated the defendant. Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d 
1094 (Ala. 1988). In Bui, a Vietnamese refugee separated from his wife, suspected she 
was seeing other men. He killed his three children because he did not want his wife to 
"get them." A cross-cultural counselor was not permitted to testify concerning defend-
ant's medical condition because he was not qualified to judge the defendant's sanity. 
82. People v. Croy, No. 131832 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1990). 
83. Croy, his sister Norma Jean and cousin Darrell Jones were being chased by 
Yreka police officers, Siskiyou County sheriffs and California Highway Patrol officers. 
They fled to their grandmother's cabin in the hills, chased by the authorities. Norma 
Jean and Darrell were shot at the cabin in which Croy's grandmother was living. When 
Croy neared the cabin, Bo Hittson, a Yreka lawman, surprised him from behind. Hittson 
shot twice and Croy fired one fatal shot. A jury convicted Croy of first-degree murder 
and he was sentenced to death. However, upon retrial, Croy raised a cultural defense, 
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The Wu and Croy cases recognize the diversity of nationali-
ties, varied experiences and cultural backgrounds of the people 
in California. By allowing a cultural background defense, the 
courts have recognized that not just one set of values exists upon 
which every person's actions must be judged. The impact of this 
defense on the criminal justice system in California could be far-
reaching because of the diversity of the population. 
However, the Wu case did not clearly define the standards 
by which a cultural background defense could be raised. There-
fore, the application of the defense presents some interesting is-
sues and questions. Perhaps the most difficult and controversial 
issue is. what constitutes a "valid" defense? Should it be a de-
fense to infanticide of an infant girl when the defendant is part 
of a culture that promotes males over females? Should it be a 
defense to violence against a woman when the defendant is part 
of a culture that condones such violence? 
The courts may find it difficult to determine what a valid 
defense is because inevitably it would inject another value sys-
tem into the particular crime. This may defeat the purpose of 
the cultural background defense. At the same time, it is neces-
sary to draw a line somewhere to avoid using culture as a justifi-
cation for committing a crime. 
Another issue this defense raises is to whom does the de-
fense apply? In the Wu case, Helen came from a culture which 
stigmatizes children born out of wedlock. In the United States 
however, children born out of wedlock are not treated in the 
same manner as they are in China. The defense apparently ap-
plies' to racial minorities, but can it apply to everyone? Culture 
is a part of each of our lives and it could be argued that the set 
of "American values" generally promoted in society is that of 
the dominant population. Although changing, many of the insti-
tutions in American society are controlled by the majority white 
population. As a result, these dominant values become inherent 
within our society. The cultural defense recognizes that there 
can no longer be only one set of dominant values. Therefore, this 
arguing he did not feel that he could surrender to the police, based on the history of 
relations with the white settlers and the genocide of 95% of the Native Americans in the 
area. As a result, Croy was acquitted. David Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy. LA 
TIMES. June 24, 1990, (Magazine) at 16, 18. 
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cultural defense should only apply to racial or ethnic minorities, 
whose cultures promote different values. 
Another issue raised 'is the difference between immigrant 
and American-born populations, even within the same ethnicity. 
In the Wu case and in the other cases where the defense has 
been unsuccessfully raised, the defendants were immigrants and 
their beliefs came directly from another culture. But would the 
defense apply to third or fourth generations born in the United 
States or would the court determine that "assimilation" into 
western culture had occurred? It is impossible to make a "blan-
ket" determination one way or another. Instead, this issue 
should be left to the trier of fact to determine the cultural im-
pact on the individual defendant by relying on the facts of the 
case, the· characteristics of the individual's particular cultural 
background and how these characteristics manifest themselves 
in his or her life. 
A related issue is the difference between ethnicity and cul-
ture. What about the situation where a child is adopted at birth 
by parents of another nationality? What would the culture of 
that child be? An individual does not inherently possess certain 
cultural characteristics. Rather, an individual learns cultural val-
ues from the family and the community in which he or she is 
raised. The determination of how culture impacts an individual's 
life should again be left to the trier of fact as discussed above. 
A final issue raised is the concept of belief in the afterlife. 
Potentially, this could expand the defense for any person who 
believes in the afterlife. However, the Wu case does not address 
this belief as a religious belief in and of itself, but only within 
the .context of Helen Wu's cultural background and beliefs. 
Therefore, the defense appears to be limited to the connections 
between a cultural background and belief in the afterlife, and 
not a general religious belief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Wu decision may have a very positive impact on crimi-
nal law defense. The cultural background defense is especially 
significant in California given that racial minorities constitute 
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over forty-three percent of the population.84 Further, over sev-
enty percent of those incarcerated in the California state prison 
system are minorities. 811 Although it is not clear how many of 
these prisoners could have utilized the cultural background de-
fense, it is likely that the use of the' defense could have caused 
their cases to turn out much differently. The cultural back-
ground defense should lend to a more equitable system of 
justice. 
Donna L. Kotake* 
84. The racial composition of the total population in California is: 57.12% white and 
other race; 7.4% Black; .08% American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut; 9.6% Asian or Pacific 
Islander and 25.8% Hispanic origin. 1990 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 1: Selected 
Population and Housing Characteristics, California. 
85. The prison system in California has the following racial composition: 29.1% 
White, 33.8% Black, 32.2% Hispanic and 4.9% Other. CDC Facts, CAL. DEP'T. CORR., 
August 1, 1992 at 1. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
A human fetus that is injured while in the womb cannot be the 
victim of manslaughter unless it dies after being born alive by 
exhibiting some sign of (1) circulation or respiration, and (2) 
brain activity, during or after its birth, rather than dying while 
still in the womb. 
People v .. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Ct. App. 1992). Scott 
Flores was under the influence of alcohol when he drove his car 
over a center divider of a freeway and collided with a car driven 
by Sylvia Bacon who was eight and one-half months pregnant. l 
She was taken to a hospital where an emergency Caesarian sec-
tion was performed.2 Although the fetus3 had a slow, faint heart-
beat lasting a few minutes, it never began breathing.' Mr. Flores 
was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated 
in the death of the fetus.~ The trial court dismissed the charge 
because of insufficient evidence that the fetus was a "human be-
ing" within the meaning of the manslaughter statute.6 The pros-
ecution appealed: 7 
The California Court of Appeal for the S'econd District af-
firmed. 8 The appellate court followed the common law "born 
alive" rule which defines "human being" as that term is used in 
homicide statutes to mean a person who has been born alive.S 
The court held that under Health and Safety Code section 
7180(a), a fetus is born alive if it exhibits some sign of (1) circu-
1. People v. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 120-21 (Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Id. at 121. 
3. The court refers to the product of Ms. Bacon's pregnancy as a "fetus/infant" be-
cause, "[s)ince the question of whether this was a fetus or a living infant is the ultimate 
issue to be decided on appeal, it is appropriate to use both terms in the disjunctive until 
that issue is resolved." Id. at 121 n.1. This Case Note uses the term "fetus" merely for 
simplicity; as used herein, "fetus" refers to any human child from conception through 
birth. 
4. Id. at 121. 
5. Id. at 122. 
6. Id. at 122. 
7. Id. at 120. 
8. Id. at 126. 
9. Id. at 122. 
1081 
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lation or respiration, and (2) brain activity, during or after its 
birth, and since Ms. Bacon's fetus showed no sign of brain activ-
ity, it was not born alive and therefore was not a "human being" 
within the meaning of the manslaughter statute. 10 
FACTS 
At approximately 7 p.m. on January 2S, 1990, Scott Eric 
Flores, the defendant, was driving his car on the Long Beach 
Freeway at an estimated speed of 75 to SO miles per hour. ll He 
failed to navigate a curve,12 swerved as he overcorrected in 
rounding the curve, and ultimately crossed the center divider 
into oncoming traffic, colliding head-on with a car driven by 
Sylvia Bacon.13 After the accident, a police officer noticed that 
the defendant was exhibiting signs of intoxication and directed a 
nurse to withdraw a blood sample from the defendant at approx-
imately 9 p.m. which, when later analyzed, showed that the de-
fendant had a blood-alcohol level of .lS.14 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Bacon was approximately 
eight and one-half months pregnant.1& She suffered a nose bleed, 
cuts and bruises to her arms and hip, and, immediately after the 
acciden~, an abdominal contraction and nauseation. I6 
Ms. Bacon was taken to a hospital where a female fetus was 
delivered by an emergency Caesarian section at approximately 
10 p.m. I7 Although the fetus was pale, in shock and not breath-
ing or moving, a very faint, slow heartbeat of less than twenty 
beats per minute was detected several minutes after its deliv-
ery.lS The doctor attempted to resuscitate the fetus by forcing 
10. [d. at 125-26. 
11. [d. at 120-21. The defendant claimed that he was traveling at approximately 60 
miles per hour. [d. at 121. 
12. [d. at 121. The defendant claimed that his car pulled to the right. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. The defendant's blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit. See CAL. VEH. 
CODE §§ 23152(b), 23153(b) (West Supp. 1993). 
15. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12l. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. In the doctor's opinion, the very low heart rate was the result of the fetus's 
inability to breath; it had been in the process of dying for a while prior to the Caesarian 
section. Based on these heartbeats, the doctor later characterized the birth medically as 
a "live birth." [d. 
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air into its lungs.19 Its heartbeat was checked again two or three 
minutes later, but none was detected.20 The doctor continued to 
try to resuscitate the fetus for some fourteen minutes, but to no 
avail; it never began breathing.21 Ms. Bacon's fetus was declared 
dead at 10:28 p.m.22 
Ms. Bacon's gynecologist had examined her eight days 
before the car accident and found that her pregnancy was pro-
gressing normally.23 An autopsy showed that the fetus was a 
fully developed, substantially normal24 female with no obvious 
physical trauma.25 The fetus did, however, have one improperly 
functioning lung; it contained substantially less oxygen than did 
the other lung.26 The fetus had been in distress prior to birth as 
evidenced by its aspiration of amniotic fluid. 27 Although, in the 
medical examiner's opinion, the fetus died during the perinatal 
period28 from undetermined causes,29 she did identify the auto-
mobile accident as a contributing cause and could discern no 
medical reason to believe the fetus would have been born In a 
distressed condition had the accident not occurred.30 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The defendant was charged by information with gross vehic-
19. [d. This process is called intubation. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. Some air was forced into the fetus's lungs as a result of the intubation; this, 
h6wever, is not breathing. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. At that time, Ms. Bacon was thirty-eight weeks pregnant and the fetus had a 
heart rate of less than forty beats per minute. Ms. Bacon's due date was February 14, 
1990. Ms. Bacon had been admitted to the hospital from December 26 through Decem-
ber 29, 1989, for premature labor. She previously had given birth prematurely to an 
anencephalic baby. [d. at 121-22. 
24. The fetus appeared normal except for two extra fingers; these were mere tags of 
flesh and represented a trivial congenital birth defect. [d. at 122. 
25. [d. at 121. 
26. [d. at 122. 
27. [d. 
28. The perinatal period is defined as the period immediately before, during and 
after birth. [d. 
29. The finding of death from undetermined causes was a function of the operation 
of a number of factors in a perinatal death, which normally permits no anatomical find-
ings. There are three separate systems at work in perinatal deaths: the fetus, the mother 
and the placenta. This means that there will normally be a variety of factors involved in 
a perinatal death and, at the autopsy stage, it generally is impossible to determine sepa-
rately the precise operation of these factors. [d. 
30. Id. 
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ular manslaughter while intoxicated.s1 The magistrate at the 
preliminary hearing in municipal court found sufficient cause to 
believe that the defendant was guilty and thus ordered that he 
be held to answer to the offense in superior court. S2 The defense 
moved to set aside the information pursuant to California Penal 
Code section 995 on grounds that there was not probable cause 
to believe the defendant was guilty of manslaughter because 
there was insufficient evidence that the victim was a "human be-
ing" within the meaning of the manslaughter statute.ss The su-
perior court granted the motion. S4 The People of the State of 
California appeal from this order.31i 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In an appeal from the superior court's order granting a de-
fendant's section 995 motion, the appellate court ignores such 
order and instead directly reviews the magistrate's decision to 
31. [d. 
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
Sufficient cause within the meaning of section 872 is generally 
equivalent to that reasonable or probable cause required to 
justify an arrest. Sufficient cause and reasonable and probable 
cause mean such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordi-
nary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously enter-
tain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. 
It is clear, however, that evidence which will justify prose-
cution under the above test need not be sufficient to support a 
conviction. An information will not be set aside ... if there is 
some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an of-
fense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it .... 
[I)f there is some evidence to support the information, the [re-
viewing) court will not inquire into its sufficiency .... Finally, 
although there must be some showing as to the existence of 
each element of the charged crime such a showing may be 
made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of rea-
sonable inferences on the part of the magistrate. 
Williams v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Cal. 1969) (citations, footnotes, and 
quotations omitted). 
33. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. "[T]he information shall be set aside by the court 
in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his or her motion, ... [i]f ... the defendant 
had been committed [i.e., held to answer] without reasonable or probable cause." CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 995(a) (West Supp. 1993). A defendant's 995 motion is, in effect, an ap-
peal of the magistrate's holding (commitment) order at the preliminary hearing in mu-
nicipal court because the superior court sits merely as a reviewing court. See People v. 
Laiwa, 669 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Cal. 1983). 
34. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. 
35. [d. at 120, 122. 
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hold the defendant to answer.36 Although the appellate court 
must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the 'information, 
it cannot substitute its own judgment as to the credibility or 
weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate.37 
The defendant was charged with gross vehicular manslaugh-
ter while intoxicated in violation of California Penal Code sec-
tion 191.5(a).38 That section requires, in pertinent part, the 
"killing of a human being."39 Under the common law "born 
alive" rule, the term "human being" as used in . California homi-
cide law means only a person who has been born alive, not a 
fetus. 4o Even apart from the common law rule, omission of the 
term "fetus" from California's manslaughter statutes was an ex-
36. Id. at 122 (citing Laiwa, 669 P.2d at 1282). 
37. See id. (citing Laiwa, 669 P.2d at 1281-82). 
38. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
39. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. Subdivision (a) of that section provides in its 
entirety: 
(a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice afore-
thought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in 
violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and 
the killing was either the proximate result of the commission 
of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross 
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a law-
ful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, 
and with gross negligence. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added); see Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 122. As to Vehicle Code sections 23152 and 23153, see supra note 14 and accompa-
nying text. 
40. See Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122 (citing People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 
838 (Ct. App. 1978)). The California Penal Code does not define the term "human being" 
as it is used in the homicide statutes. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625 n.16 
(Cal. 1970). The common law may properly be looked to for the meaning of "human 
being." Id. at 619. See generally B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EpSTEIN. CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
.NAL LAW § 46 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992). 
Use of the past tense of birth is somewhat misleading. In California, a completed 
birth is not necessarily required. 
Reduced to its essence, People v. Chavez, supra, stands 
for no more than the proposition that a killing in the course of 
the birth of a demonstrably alive and viable fetus is the killing 
of a human being to the same extent as is the killing of a fully 
born live child .... Chavez does not stand for the proposition 
that a technically viable fetus is a human being if it is in the 
process of being born even though it exhibits no sign of life. 
Rather, it must be living during a birth which, in the natural 
course of events, would be completed successfully. 
Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124 (citations omitted); Keeler, 470 P.2d at 628-29; People v. 
Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)). 
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ercise of legislative judgment."1 Consequently, the issue is 
whether Ms. Bacon's fetus was born alive and therefore became 
a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaughter 
statute.42 
Although the common law is not entirely consistent on the 
issue of when a fetus is born alive, circulation is not in itself 
sufficient proof of a live birth; there must also be respiration."3 
Consequently, evidence that Ms. Bacon's fetus had a faint, slow 
heartbeat lasting no more than a few minutes is insufficient in 
itself to establish that the fetus was born alive by common law 
standards.44 
Whatever result might be reached under common law stan- . 
dards, courts may resort to a common law definition of a state of 
being only when there is no statutory definition.4!! California 
Health and Safety Code section 7180(a) defines death as the 
lack of (1) circulation and respiration, or (2) brain activity.46 But 
inasmuch as death is merely the obverse of life, a statutory defi-
nition of death may be used to determine the presence of life."7 
Accordingly, that section provides the best means of determin-
ing whether a fetus is born alive."s Consequently, under the 
obverse of section 7180(a), a fetus is born alive, and therefore 
becomes a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaugh-
ter statute, if it exhibits some sign of (1) circulation49 or respira-
41. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122 (citing Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838). 
42. See id. 
43. [d. at 125 (citing State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678, 681-83 (Kan. 1989)). But in Mor-
gan u. State, a few weak heartbeats were sufficient to establish a live birth'by common 
law standards. 256 S.W. 433, 434 (Tenn. 1923). That case is distinguishable, however, in 
that the criminal acts which caused the infant's death occurred after its birth. "In that 
context, that the allegedly criminal act precedes the infant's drawing of a breath assur-
edly does not establish that the infant is not yet born alive when it is killed." Flores, 4 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124-25. 
44. Flores, 4 Cal Rptr. 2d at 125. 
. 45. [d. (citing People v. Mitchell, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 n.2 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
46. [d. "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circula-
tory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem, is dead." CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West 
Supp. 1993) (emphasis added); Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125. 
47. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (citing State v. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d 434, 436 
(Wis. 1989)). 
48. [d. at 125 (citing cf. Mitchell, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 169 n.2 (applying statutory, 
rather than common law, definition of "death")). 
49. The existence at birth of an independent heartbeat alone is sufficient to estab-
lish that there has been no irreversible cessation of the metabolic functions of circulation 
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tion,60 and (2) brain activity, during or after its birth.61 
Although Ms. Bacon's fetus exhibited at least a weak circu-
lation, it exhibited no signs of brain activity.62 Accordingly, the 
People failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the 
fetus was born alive and thus a "human being" as that term is 
used in the manslaughter statute.63 As such, the magistrate's im-
plied factual find'ing to the contrary is not supported by the evi-
dence.64 The order of dismissal is affirmed.66 
CRITIQUE 
The common law "born alive" rule was reaffirmed in Cali-
fornia over twenty years ago in Keeler v. Superior Court,66 per-
haps the most widely-noted opinion on the subject of homicide 
of the unborn child.67 The defendant in that case brutally at-
tacked his ex-wife with the expressed intention of "stomping" 
her fetus out of her.68 The attack killed the fetus69 and the de-
and respiration. Id. (citing Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 436). 
50. Breathing (respiration) apparently does not occur without some form of brain 
activity. Id. at 125-26 (citing Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 436). This perhaps may be in-
ferred by a layperson or may need to be established by expert medical testimony. But 
these issues need not be reached because there is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Ba-
con's fetus even attempted breathing. Id. at 126. 
51. See id. at l25. The Flores court did not articulate the test for presence of life 
other than to merely say: "Since death is present when only one of the prongs of the 
statute is satisfied, neither must be satisfied for life to be present." I d. Therefore, the 
test would appear to be: an individual who has sustained neither (1) irreversible cessa-
tion of the circulatory and respiratory functions, nor (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is alive. Put more simply, an individ-
ual who has some (1) circulation or respiration, and (2) brain activity, is alive. See id. at 
125-26. 




56. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
57. Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and 
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. R. 563, 603 (1987). 
58. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618. The defendant intercepted his ex-wife on a mountain 
road five months after their divorce and discovered that she was pregnant by another 
man. This so enraged him that he exclaimed "I'm going to stomp it out of you," pushed 
her, hit her in the face several times, and shoved his knee into her abdomen. Id. 
59. The fetus died in utero of a severely fractured skull and hemorrhaging as a re-
sult of the force applied to the mother's abdomen. Id. The fetus was estimated to be 
about eight and one-half months old with a seventy-five to ninety-six percent chance of 
survival if it had been born prematurely immediately prior to the attack. Id. at 619 & 
n.1. 
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fendant was charged with its murder.60 The California Supreme 
Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition preventing his 
prosecution.61 The court followed the "born alive" rule62 and 
thus interpreted the murder statute's63 use of the term "human 
being" to exclude fetuses. 64 
In response to the perceived injustice of the Keeler decision, 
the California Legislature amended the murder statute to pro-
vide for "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus" with 
exceptions for (1) legal abortions, (2) acts by a physician to save 
the life of the mother of the fetus, and (3) acts solicited, aided, 
abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus. 61i The courts 
60. Id. at 619. 
61. Id. at 630. 
62. The court traced the rule to America from early English common law citing 
Bracton, Hale, Hawkins, Coke, and Blackstone. Id. at 620-22. The court then traced the 
legislative history of the murder statute and concluded that the Legislature intended the 
term "human being" to have its common law meaning. Id. at 619, 622-24. The court 
refused to abandon the rule as obsolete because, as a matter of jurisdiction, that power is 
vested in the Legislature, not the judiciary, and, as a matter of constitutional principle, 
retroactive expansion of the statute would violate due process. Id. at 624-30. 
63. At that time, the murder statute provided in its entirety: "Murder is the unlaw-
ful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 
1970) (amended 1971). 
64. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 622, 624. 
65. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1311, § 1, at 2440. The murder statute now provides in its 
entirety: 
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, 
with malice aforethought. 
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an 
act which results in the death of a fetus if any of the following 
apply: 
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion 
Act, Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of 
Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code. 
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's 
and surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Business and 
Professions Code, in a case where, to a medical cer-
tainty, the result of childbirth would be death of the 
mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth, 
although not medically certain, would be substantially 
certain or more likely than not. 
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented 
to by the mother of the fetus. 
(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the pros-
ecution of any person under any other provision of law. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988). For the text of the murder statute prior to its 
amendment in 1971, see supra note 63. As to Keeler and the legislative response thereto, 
see generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 450; Robert W. MacCartee, Note, Infanticide in 
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imposed an additional exception for nonviable fefuses; to be the 
victim of murder, the fetus must have been viable66 in the sense 
California: The Impact of Keeler y. Superior Court of Amador County and the Septem-
ber 17, 1970, Amendment to Penal Code Section 187, 7 CAL. W. L. REV. 272 (1970); 
Borden D. Webb, Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child Homicide? 
California's Law to Punish the Willful Killing of a Fetus, 2 PAC. L.J. 170 (1971); cf. 
Louis E. Boyle, Comment, The Fetus as a Legal Entity-Facing Reality, 8 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 126 (1971) (comment mistakenly states that the Legislature amended the murder 
and manslaughter statutes to provide that "human being" includes a fetus). 
66. People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502-503 (Ct. App. 1976). 
[Ujntil viability has been reached the state has no interest in 
the fetus that it is entitled to protect against the wishes of the 
mother. The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that 
until viability is reached, human life in the legal sense has not 
. come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as 
a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a non-viable 
fetus is not a taking of human life. It follows that such de-
struction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, 
whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third 
person. 
Id. at 502. The Smith decision has been criticized as unnecessarily broadening the scope 
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), beyond its constitutional context. 
An accurate reading of Roe dictates, as scholars have increas-
ingly concluded, that it .does not apply to the context of non-
consensual third party acts against the unborn child . 
. . . Roe "was limited to the regulation of the voluntary 
abortion." Moreover, ... while Roe involved the right of pri-
vacy of the mother, "no countervailing privacy right" was 
presented in the case of unconsented to violent acts by a third 
party . 
. . . [T)he principle that the unborn child does not have 
constitutional rights when balanced against the woman's con-
stitutional right to privacy does not at all mean that the fetus 
may not have common law or statutory rights when balanced 
against the criminal acts of a third party .... Roe v. Wade is 
not directed to non consensual acts by third parties. It is not a 
bar to judicial or statutory recognition of the rights of the un-
born child against ... criminal acts of third parties. 
Forsythe, supra note 57, at 614-19 (footnotes omitted) (quoting State v. Brown, 378 So. 
2d 916, 919 (La. 1979) (Blanche, J., dissenting)); see People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 215 
(Ill. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting: "Exteriding the protection of the criminal law to, at 
least, viable fetuses would in no way infringe upon the mother's right to privacy which 
was the linchpin of Roe v. Wade."). 
And yet there is an incongruity in criminally punishing a third person for doing 
essentially what the pregnant woman herself has a right to do. Boyle, supra note 65, at 
134; see MacCartee, supra note 65, at 285 ("It is inherently unjust to hold one answera-
ble for homicide of a fetus which, at the time of the act, could not sustain life outside its 
mother's womb."). Perhaps the soundest rationale for limiting third party criminalliabil-
ity to the homicide of viable fetuses is to avoid difficult legal and philosophical problems 
with proving causation (i.e., that the defendant caused the fetus not to be born alive). 
See John P. Nahra, Comment, Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12 
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that it could have survived the trauma of birth on its own or 
with artificial medical aid.57 In amending the murder statute, 
the Legislature did not abandon the "born alive" rule; that is, it 
did not redefine "human being" to include fetuses. 58 Rather, it 
implicitly endorsed the "born alive" rule; a contrary conclusion 
would render the phrase "or a fetus" superfluous and criminal 
statutes should be construed to avoid rendering any of their 
words superfluous.59 
But the Legislature failed to similarly amend the man-
slaughter statutes.70 This failure was not due to legislative over-
sight.71 The legislative history of the bill72 that amended the 
murder statute clearly indicates that the failure to similarly 
amend the manslaughter statutes was an exercise of legislative 
judgment.73 The Legislature felt that the key reason for making 
a fetus the subject of murder was the defendant's extreme culpa-
bility,74 and since that same level of purpose is not involved with 
manslaughter,7~ the change should not apply to it.78 Accordingly, 
u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 723, 735-36 nn.58-60 (1979). 
67. People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835-37 (Ct. App. 1978); People v. Hen-
derson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 853 (Ct. App. 1990). 
68. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (Ct. App. 1977). This was a 
conscious choice by the Legislature. Earlier versions of the bill had redefined "human 
being" to include a fetus into or beyond the twentieth week of uterogestation. Webb, 
supra note 65, at 172-75. 
69. Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 414 n.22 (Cal. 1991). See 
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988); WITKIN, supra note 40, § 36. 
70. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 122; Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; People v. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Ct. 
App. 1974). 
71. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Even if the failure were due to legislative over-
sight, correction would have to be by the Legislature. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326. 
72. A.B. 816, Cal. Leg., Reg. 'Sess. (1970). 
73. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122; Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Webb, supra note 
65, at 170, 172-175, 181. Indeed, earlier versions of the bill applied to both murder and 
manslaughter. Webb, supra note 65, at 172, 174. 
74. Murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought (or where. the felony-
murder rule is properly applied). Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 839; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 
187 (West 1988). A killing where the defendant either (1) intended to kill or do great 
bodily injury to the victim and did not act during a reasonable heat of passion, or (2) 
recklessly caused the victim's death under circumstances showing such wantoness and a 
conscious disregard for life that the defendant is said to have an "abandoned and malig-
nant heart," is with malice aforethought and thus is murder. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 
(West 1988). See generally WITKIN, supra note 40, §§ 486-509; THE COMMITTEE ON STAN-
DARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, 
CALIFORNIA. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL forms 8.10-.31, 8.51-.52 (West 1993) 
[hereinafter CALJIC). 
75. Absent 8 permissible application of the felony-murder rule, manslaughter is an 
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in California there is no crime of manslaughter of a fetus" and 
the courts cannot create one by judicial fiat.7s Consequently, 
whether fetal manslaughter ought to be a crime continues to be 
a question for the Legislature to address, not the judiciary.79 
Other criminal statutes do not already proscribe the acts 
which would be proscribed by a fetal manslaughter statute. so For 
unlawful killing without malice. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 
1993); Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Carlson, -112 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27 (finding that 
lower court improperly applied transferred intent and felony-murder rules to killing of 
fetus). A killing where the defendant either (1) intended to kill or do great bodily injury 
to the victim and acted during a reasonable heat of passion (called voluntary manslaugh-
ter), or (2) caused the victim's death by gross (or in some cases, ordinary) negligence 
(called involuntary or vehicular manslaughter), is without malice and thus is manslaugh-
ter. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally WITKIN. 
supra note 40, §§ 510-31; CALJIC, supra note 74, forms 8.37-.51. 
76. Webb, supra note 65, at 174. 
77. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 324-27. 
78. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. "No act or omission ... is criminal or punish-
able, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 
1988). The same conclusion was reached with regard to fetal murder before the murder 
statute was amended: 
Penal Code section 6 ... embodies a fundamental princi-
ple of our tripartite form of government, i. e., that subject to 
the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested 
exclusively in the legislative branch. Stated differently, there 
are no common law crimes in California . 
. . . Whether to thus extend liability for murder [of a fe-
tus) in California is a determination solely within the province 
of the Legislature. For a court to simply declare, by judicial 
fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section 
187 one who kills an unborn but viable fetus would indeed be 
to rewrite the statute under the guise of construing it. 
Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624-26 (Cal. 1970) (citations and footnote omit-
ted). See generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 14. 
79. See supra note 73; Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326. 
80. Prosecutors have occasionally attempted to stretch existing.criminal statutes to 
cover injury or death to a fetus, usually caused by its mother. For example, the crime of 
child endangerment provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions 
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes 
or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable 
physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or cus-
tody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or 
.health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or per-
mits such child to be placed in such situation that its person 
or health is endangered, is [guilty of a felony). 
(2) Any person who [does the same as described in subdi-
vision (1), except) under circumstances or conditions other 
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example, despite dicta to the contrary in some cases,8} the crime 
of abortion82 might not proscribe fetal killings that are not con-
sented to by the mother of the fetus. 83 In any event, abortion 
than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, ... is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1)'(West 1988). This crime does not apply to fetuses or mater-
nal prenatal misconduct, such as illegal drug use during pregn.ancy. Reyes v. Superior 
Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913-15 (Ct. App. 1977). 
Similarly, the crime of failure to provide for a child provides in pertinent part: 
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful 
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical 
attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or 
she is guilty of a misdemeanor .... A child conceived' but not 
yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this 
section is concerned. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). This crime also apparently does not proscribe ma-
ternal prenatal misconduct that could injure the fetus, such as illegal drug use. See Re-
becca Manson & Judy Marolt, A New Crime: Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to Pro-
tect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?, 24 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1988). 
81. The California Supreme Court said in dicta: 
It is ... no defense to a charge of violating section 274 that 
the act was ... by a method not commonly used for that pur-
pose [of procuring a miscarriage). The prohibition is against 
"any means which might be used to effect a miscarriage," and 
has been applied to instances of beating or other physical vio-
lence inflicted upon the person of the woman for this purpose. 
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627-28 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Clapp, 153 P.2d 758, 761 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1944)). And the court in People v. Smith said in dicta: "The un viable 
fetus does not go unprotected. As happened here, [the non consensual) destruction of an 
unviable fetus may be punished under the criminal abortion statute, Penal Code section 
274." People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503-504 (Ct. App. 1976). 
82. The California abortion statute provides in its entirety: 
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to 
any women, or procures any woman to take any medicine, 
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other 
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscar-
riage of such woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic 
Abortion Act, Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of 
Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 275, 276 (West 1988) 
(solicitation of abortion); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1108 (West 1985) ("the defendant cannot 
be convicted upon the testimony of the woman upon or with whom the offense was com-
mitted, unless she is corroborated by other evidence"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West 
Supp. 1993) (sentence enhancement for intentional infliction of injury upon pregnant 
woman causing termination of pregnancy). 
83. Nahra, supra note 66, at 726, 729-32. The statute is ambiguous as to the prohib-
ited "means" of abortion. Arguably, the phrase "any ... other means whatever" is re-
stricted in scope by the previous specific proscriptions which uniformly involve consen-
sual miscarriages. Id. at 730. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, general words in a 
criminal statute are limited to matters similar to those previously specifically stated. 
People v. Silver, 108 P.2d 4, 7-8 (Cal. 1940); People v. Fields, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336, 338 (Ct. 
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only proscribes certain intentional fetal killings,8. whereas a fe-
tal manslaughter statute would proscribe intentional and unin-
tentional fetal killings.86 Thus, the anomaly in California crimi-
nal law-that fetal murder is a crime but the logically lesser-
included offense of fetal manslaughter is not-remains.86 
App. 1980). See generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 26. But dicta by the California Su-
preme Court might nevertheless be binding on the lower California courts. See People v. 
Triggs, 506 P.2d 232, 236 (Cal. 1973). 
84. The statute states in pertinent part that the defendant must act "with intent 
thereby to procure a miscarriage." CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988). Apparently, the 
defendant must actually intend that the fetus miscarry, not merely that it die within the 
womb. 
In the present case, it will be remembered, petitioner's avowed 
goal was not primarily to kill the fetus while it was inside his 
wife's body, but rather to "stomp it out of" her; although one 
presumably cannot be done without the other,. petitioner's 
choice of words is significant and strongly implies an "intent 
thereby to procure the miscarriage" of his wife in violation of 
section 274. 
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627-28. "It is doubtful, however, that defendants in the Keeler mode 
ever intended to accomplish anything but the killing of the fetus." Nahra, supra note 66, 
at 732 n.41. 
85. It has been argued that "[tlhe most significant negative effect of the manslaugh-
ter gap is its failure to prohibit intentional fetal killing accompanied by the mental ele-
ment associated with voluntary manslaughter." Nahra, supra note 66, at 727. It is inter-
esting to note that the Legislature may not have achieved its goal of nullifying the 
Keeler decision when it amended the murder statute. The defendant in Keeler may have 
acted under a reasonable heat of passion and thus mitigated the crime from murder to 
voluntary manslaughter. If that were the case, he would escape criminal punishment 
even under today's homicide laws. He was certainly in a heat of passion. And that heat 
of passion would be reasonable if a jury believed q) that discovering that his ex-wife' 
became pregnant by another man during their marriage was an adequate provocation, 
and (2) that a reasonable man would not have cooled-down after first learning of this 
and before acting. See generally WITKIN, supra note 40, §§ 511-17; CALJIC, supra note 
74, forms 8.40-.44. 
A related problem with the "manslaughter gap" is that since a jury instruction on 
fetal manslaughter is not required, a jury that is given the all-or-nothing choice of mur-
der or acquittal may be more likely to convict a defendant of fetal murder even when 
fetal manslaughter would have been more appropriate. Nahra, supra note 66, at 727-28. 
Contra People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838-39 (Ct. App. 1978). 
86. Nahra, supra note 66, at 727. . 
The manslaughter gap is logically at odds with the intrin-
sic relationship between murder and manslaughter. Man-
slaughter is inherently a lesser and included offense of murder. 
By definition, the only difference between the crimes of mur-
der and manslaughter is the mental state of the actor. If a 
subject can be a murder victim, then logically that subject can 
be the victim of manslaughter if certain circumstances result 
in a mitigation of malice. The status of the victim should be 
irrelevant in distinguishing between the two crimes. To distin-
guish the crimes in terms of the victim's status is tantamount 
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The original rationale for the common law "born alive" rule 
is no longer valid and thus provides no justification for excluding 
fetuses as potential victims of manslaughter.87 The "born alive" 
rule was well-established at common law by the mid-17th cen-
tury.88 The rule did not develop as a substantive moral defini-
tion of a human being; that is, it did not reflect a common law 
belief -that fetuses were not worthy of the protection of criminal 
law.89 Rather, the rule developed merely as an evidentiary pre-
to acknowledging a qualitatively significant distinction be-
tween the mental state of a murderer of a fetus and the mur-
derer of a human being. Such a distinction has no basis in fact 
or reason. 
[d. at 729 (footnotes omitted). 
87. See Forsythe, supra note 57; passim; MacCartee, supra note at 65, at 272-73, 
285. 
88. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Cal. 1970) (quoting common law 
authorities Bracton, Coke, Blackstone, Hale, and Hawkins, and noting that early com-
mon law, possibly reflecting doctrines of medieval canon law, may have been otherwise). 
Perhaps the most influential statement of the ~'born alive" 
rule is that of Coke, in mid-17th century: "If a woman be 
quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in 
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in 
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great 
misprision [i. e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the 
childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other 
cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable 
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive." (3 Coke, In-
stitutes "58 (1648).) ... [T]he common law accepted his views 
as authoritative. In the 18th century, for example, Coke's re-
quirement that an infant be born alive in order to be the sub-
ject of homicide was reiterated and expanded by both Black-
stone and Hale. 
[d. at 620 (footnotes omitted). See generally Forsythe, supra note 57, at 583-585; Cyril 
C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 
1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 420 (1968); Stan-
ley B. Atkinson, Life, Birth, and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. Rev. 134, 135 (1904); WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT. JR.. CRIMINAL LAW § 7.l(c) (2d ed. 1986); ROLLIN M. PERKINS 
& RONALD N. BOYCE. CRIMINAL LAW chap. 2, § l(B) (3d ed. 1982); CHARLES E. TORCIA. 2 
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 112, 114 (14th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1991); OSCAR L. WARREN & 
BASIL M. BILAS. 1 WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 55 (1938); 40 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Homi-
cide § 9 (2d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1992); 40 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Homicide § 3(b) (1991); 
WITKIN. supra note 40, § 450; Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 
40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Proof of 
Live Birth in Prosecution for Killing Newborn Child, 65 A.L.R. 3d 413, 415-16 (1975 & 
Supp. 1992); State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 1791) (earliest published American decision 
adopting "born alive" rule); People v. Eldridge, 86 P. 832 (1906) (earliest California deci-
sion adopting "born alive" rule in dictum); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (1947) (same 
except not dictum); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.l(c) & cmt. 4(c) (Proposed Official Draft 
1980) (adopting "born alive" rule to avoid entanglement of abortion in the law of 
homicide).. , 
89. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 586, 589. If the rule was a substantive definition of a 
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sumption that the fetus was already dead at the time of the de-
fendant's act or would have been born dead; this presumption 
was rebuttable by proof of the fetus's subsequent live birth.90 
This presumption was predicated on the extremely high infant 
mortality rate and poor medical knowledge of the time which 
made the task of proving that the defendant caused the fetus's 
death a practical impossibility, except by proof of a subsequent 
live birth.91 But this is no longer the case; modern medical sci-
human being, then the victim would need to be a human being both at the time of the 
injury and at the time of death in order for the corpus delicti of homicide to be satisfied. 
In practice, the born alive rule was applied to proscribe as 
homicide the killing of a child even if the mortal injuries were 
inflicted in utero. If the rule was truly a substantive definition 
of human being, and a fetus only became a human being at 
birth, then injuring an unborn child in utero would not be in-
juring a human being. In that case, the death of the child out 
of the womb could not satisfy the corpus delicti, because the 
criminal agency of the defendant-the moral connection be-
tween the infliction of the injury and the resulting 
death-would not exist. The child would not be a human be-
ing both at the time of the injury and the time of the death. If 
the born alive rule was a substantive rule, then homicide could 
. only result from injuries inflicted after birth, because only 
then would they be inflicted on "a human being." 
[d. at 589 (footnotes omitted); see also LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 3.11 (discussing require-
ment that defendant's mental state and act must concur in time). 
90. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 95 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 
3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra note 57, passim; Webb, supra note 
65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281. 
91. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); Annotation, Homicide Based on 
Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra 
note 57, passim; Webb, supra note 65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281. 
The "born alive" rule is analogous to two other common law evidentiary rules that 
developed out of the primitive state of medical science at common law: the "year-and-a-
day" rule and the rule defining death itself. Many states have abolished these rules in 
whole or in part. Forsythe, supra note 54, at 592-95; see e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 194 
(West 1988). 
We commonly conceive of human existence as a spectrum 
stretching from birth to death. However, if this court properly 
might expand the the definition of "human being" at one end 
of that spectrum, we may do so at the other end. Consider the 
following example: All would agree that ... a corpse is not 
considered a "human being" and thus cannot be the subject of 
a "killing" as those terms are used in homicide statutes. How-
ever, it is readily apparent that our concepts of what consti-
tutes a "corpse" have been and are continually modified by 
advances ·in the field of medicine .... Would this court ig-
nore these developments and exonerate the killer of an appar-
ently "drowned" child merely because that child would have 
been pronounced dead in 1648 or 1850? Obviously not. 
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ence has progressed to the point of eliminating or at least seri-
ously weakening the evidentiary problems which confronted the 
common law.92 Accordingly, the original rationale for the "born 
alive" rule is no longer valid and on this basis the rule itself is 
obsolete and anachronistic.93 
The "born alive" rule has also been criticized because it 
leads to unjust, arbitrary, and anomalous results.94 If the fetus 
survives long enough to take a single breath during or after its 
birth, the defendant committed homicide.9~ But if the fetus dies 
a moment before that, then homicide has not occurred.96 Crimi-
nal liability thus often depends on the fortuitous circumstance 
of proximity to a hospital so that a doctor can deliver the fetus 
in time to witness its death outside the womb.97 
Whether a homicide occurred in that case would be deter-
mined by medical testimony regarding the capability of the 
child to have survived prior to the defendant's act. And that is 
precisely the test which this court should adopt in the instant 
case. 
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 632 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
92. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); Annotation, Homicide Based on 
Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra 
note 57, passim; Webb, supra note 65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281. 
93. Forsythe, supra note 57, passim; MacCartee, supra note at 65, at 272-73, 285. 
Despite these criticisms, most states by court decision still follow the "born alive" 
rule. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596 n.161. Only three state courts have abandoned the 
rule. State v. Burrell, 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Cass, 476 N.E.2d 1324 
(Mass. 1984); State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596, 
n.162. Several other states, like California, have abandoned the rule, at least to some 
extent, by statute. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596-97, n.163. 
94. People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207 (III. 1980); see Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 
N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1984); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1979); 
People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639, 644 (III. App. Ct. 1982). 
95. See Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 207; supra notes 40 and 88 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra note 95. 
97. See Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 207. It has similarly been argued: 
The absurdity of the born alive concept is obvious when you 
consider the thousands of premature babies born every year. A 
prematurely delivered infant is every bit as dependent upon 
an incubator for life as it would be of its mother had it not 
been born early. Certainly, if one was to murder a premature 
baby in an incubator he would have committed homicide. But 
the born alive rule would hold that there is no homicide where 
one unlawfully kills the very same infant still in its mother's 
womb. It is inescapable that the born alive doctrine is irra-
tional and obsolete. 
MacCartee, supra note 65, at 282. 
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Because of the anachronistic98 and arbitrary99 nature of the 
common law "born alive" rule and the inherent practical 
problems with punishing fetal murder but not fetal manslaugh-
ter/oo the California Legislature may choose to make fetal man-
slaughter a crime. If it does, the privacy rightslOI of the fetus's 
mother justify exempting her from liability for fetal manslaugh-
ter, just as she is exempted from liability for fetal murder. lo2 
The pregnant woman's constitutional right to abortion requires 
her exemption from liability for acts committed before her fetus 
becomes viable. lo3 And her generalized interest in exercising au-
tonomy over her person justifies exempting her from liability for 
acts committed after viability as well; otherwise, this interest 
would be too greatly curtailed because of the broad scope of acts 
proscribed by manslaughterlo4 and the fact that her unborn 
98. See supra note 87-93 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra note 94-97 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 80-86 a~d accompanying text. 
101. The right to privacy is the right of freedom of choice in certain traditional 
specific familial, marital, sexual, and reproductive matters. See e.g., Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (sexual-
ity). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.26 
(4th ed. 1991). 
102. See supra note 65. It would also be anomalous to punish a woman for the less 
culpable crime of manslaughter of her own fetus and yet exempt her from liability for 
the more culpable crime of murder of her own fetus. See supra notes 74-76 and accom-
panying text. 
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); cf. supra note 66. 
[T]he pregnant woman has an unqualified right to abort 
before viability. Her right of privacy is absolute until this 
stage of the pregnancy. Thus, it would seem to follow that the 
state has no constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting 
the well-being of previable fetuses. According to this reason-
ing, the greater would include the lesser .... 
Richard J. Bonnie, Developments in Mental Health Law: Interventions for Prenat,al 
Misconduct, INST. OF L.. PSYCHIATRY & PUB. POL'y. U. OF VA., July-Dec. 1990, at 21, 31. 
This limitation is admittedly problematic because prenatal hazards pose their greatest 
threat early in pregnancy. Kathleen Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: 
Whose Crimes? What Punishment?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 13, 16-
17. 
104. Manslaughter does not proscribe specific acts. Rather, it proscribes any unlaw-
ful act without malice aforethought which causes death. See supra note 75. The criminal 
law may have a role to play in deterring and punishing more specific and particularly 
egregious acts of maternal prenatal misconduct which cause the fetus's death or serious 
injury. Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 23, 28. The limitation to unlawful acts is 
problematic as well since many acts which are currently legal (such as drinking alcohol) 
may nevertheless pose great dangers to the developing fetus. See Comment, Criminal 
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child is physically a part of her body. 1011 
Liability of a Prospectiue Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, WHI'ITIER L. 
REV. 363, 389-90 (1987). Pregnant women can unintentionally harm 'their fetuses in a 
multitude of ways, including illicit drug use, immoderate exercise, and sexual intercourse 
late in the pregnancy. See generally Symposium, Criminal Liability for Fetal Endanger-
ment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 11, passim; Maternal Smoking Linked 
to Cross-Eyed Newborns, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 28, 1992, at Dl. 
105. It has been argued that: 
[G)ranting a fetus rights in ... criminal law by allowing the 
state to criminally prosecute a pregnant woman for exercising 
her physical autonomy in such a way as to unintentionally 
cause damage or death to her fetus, results in an unacceptable 
statism and entails a deprivation of a pregnant woman's con-
stitutional rights to privacy, autonomy and bodily integrity . 
. . . [T)he fact that an unborn child is physically a part of 
its mother mandates that a state exercise even greater caution 
in attempting to set minimum standards of conduct, lest it un-
duly infringe upon a pregnant woman's constitutional right to 
exercise autonomy over her person . 
. . . [T)he intimate relationship between the mother and 
fetus ... by its nature should preclude criminal prosecution 
for prenatal injuries that are anything short of a malicious or 
intentional infliction of injury or short of a manifested ex-
treme indifference to the woman's own body and her fetus's 
imminent human life. 
Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her 
Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 807, 809, 815, 824 (1987); see 
also Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 174-77. A similar argument has been made with 
regard to civil maternal liability for fetal injury. 
[H)olding a mother liable for unintentionally injuring her un-
born child would subject to state scrutiny all the decisions a 
woman must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to 
term, and would infringe on her right to privacy and bodily 
autonomy .... [T)he imposition of such liability would render 
her a guarantor of the child's condition at birth, and from the 
moment of conception until birth the two would be potential 
legal adversaries .... [T)he relationship between a pregnant 
woman and her fetus is unlike that between any other plaintiff 
and defendant, since no other plaintiff depends exclusively on 
any other defendant for everything necessary to life itself, and 
no other defendant must endure profound and possibly life-
threatening biological changes to bring forth an adversary into 
the world .... [W)hether prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs 
about the reproductive abilities of women could be kept from 
interfering with a jury's determination whether a particular 
women was negligent at any point during her pregnancy [is 
questionable). 
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction 
of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R. 4th 1082, 1090-91 (1990) (discussing Stallman v. Young-
quist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)). But see Comment, supra note 104, at 388-89. 
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Moreover, exposing pregnant women to liability for man-
slaughter of their own fetuses would likely be ineffective as a 
deterrantl06 and counterproductive to the goals of promoting fe-
tal and maternal health.lo7 Furthermore, there are more effective 
and less intrusive means of addressing the problem of maternal 
prenatal misconduct, such as more accessible and inexpensive 
prenatal health care and substance abuse treatment programs. lOS 
106. The prospect of criminal punishment is not likely to deter a woman who is not 
already deterred by the prospect of having to care for a child that is born unhealthy 
because of her prenatal misconduct. Bonnie, supra note 103, at 22; see Manson & 
Marolt, supra note 80, at 172. But see Logli, supra note 104, at 26-27. 
107. It has been argued that: 
The knowledge that personal [medical) records might be 
disclosed [to police) could destroy a woman's trust in her doc-
tor and cause her to conceal facts which could be vital to both 
her health and the health of her fetus. The additional threat 
of criminal sanctions could actually injure the fetus by. fright-
ening the pregnant woman away from all types of prenatal 
care . 
. . . Since the child must remain with the mother after 
birth, there must be a healthy prenatal relationship between 
the mother and her fetus. If the mother feels that having the 
child deprived her of her autonomy, she may unconsciously 
blame the child for the intrusion. Further, since the mother is 
physiologically linked to the fetus, any emotional suffering im-
posed on the mother by the state will probably cause the child 
to suffer too. Also, a mother's emotional distress can cause 
pregnancy disorders, premature delivery, or stillbirth. 
Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 172-73; see Wendy K. Mariner et ai., Pregnancy, 
Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 30, 36-
37. But see Logli, supra note 104, at 26-27. 
108. See Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 176-77; e.g., Alcohol and Drug Af-
fected Mothers and Infants Act of 1990, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11757.50-11758 
(West 1991). 
Prosecutors argue that the purpose of these arrests is to 
get women to stop using drugs, not to end their pregnancies. 
But as Representative George Miller concluded after Congres-
sional research and hearings on the subject, "[w)omen who 
seek help for drug addiction during pregnancy cannot get 
it." ... 
The lack of appropriate drug treatment programs for 
women is a nationw(de problem. Ann O'Reilly, Director of 
Family and Children's Services for the San Francisco Depart-
ment of Social Services stated, "If these mothers were walking 
away from treatment, I might feel differently, but they are not 
walking away from treatment-they're walking away from 
waiting lists." 
Moreover, ending an addiction without help is virtually 
impossible. According to Martha Nencioli, a clinical nurse who 
counsels pregnant women seeking drug treatment, "very few 
59
et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
1100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1081 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although the Flores decision may be criticized 
on a procedural basis109 and for its use of Health and Safety 
Code section 7180(a) to determine whether a fetus has been 
born alive,l1O it cannot be criticized for continuing to follow the 
common law "born alive" rule because this is consistent with 
clear legislative intent.11l Accordingly, whether manslaughter of 
a fetus should be a crime is a question for the Legislature to 
answer.ll2 If the Legislature chooses to make it a crime, the pri-
vacy rights of pregnant women justify exempting them from lia-
women can stop on their own." 
Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime. CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/ 
Spring 1990, at 41, 42 (footnotes omitted). 
109. Evidence that Ms. Bacon's fetus had a weak heartbeat for up to five minutes 
arguably established "sufficient cause" to hold the defendant to answer under common 
law standards of what constitutes "live birth." See supra notes 18-20, 32, 36-37 and ac-
companying text; Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433, 434 (Tenn. 1923); see People v. Bolar, 
440 N.E.2d 639, 643-45 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982). The fact that Morgan involved acts which 
occurred after delivery is irrelevant since live birth still must be proved and the same 
standards have heretofore been used to prove it. Indeed, the Flores court impliedly ad-
mitted to some uncertainty in the result that would be reached under common law stan-
dards. See supra text accompanying note 45. Moreover, whether Ms. Bacon's fetus was 
born alive was a question of fact for the jury. People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 95 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1947). In any event, the Flores court adopted Health and Safety Code section 
7180(a) as the new test for live birth. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. The 
proper procedure apparently therefore should have been to remand the case for another 
preliminary hearing to give the prosecution an opportunity to satisfy this new test. 
110. Section 7180(a) does afterall define "death," not "born alive." And there is no 
evidence that the Legislature intended it to define "born alive." On the contrary, since 
the Legislature intends "human being" to have its common law meaning of a person 
"born alive," it seems inescapable that it intends "born alive" to have its common law 
meaning as well. Perhaps the court was merely attempting to justify adopting a more 
easily applied rule for what constitutes "born alive" than the morass of confusing and 
often inconsistent common law rules. 
It should also be noted that the required proof of brain activity under section 
7180(a) is an almost insurmountable burden. 
Defendant's contention that brain activity be required for 
a finding of live birth is a luxury that is impossible to afford. 
Testimony at trial indicated that this could only be conclu-
sively established through use of an electroencephalogram. 
Though no testimony was adduced we believe that constraints 
of time, availability of equipment, and incompatability with 
life-saving measures renders this requirement totally 
impractical. 
People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ill. App. 1982). However, the Flores court left open 
the possibility that brain activity could be inferred from respiration (breathing). See 
supra note 50. 
111. See supra notes 41, 70-77 and accompanying text.' 
112. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text, 
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bility, as they are for fetal murder.ll3 
The Flores decision raises one of the most controversial and 
heavily-debated subjects of our time: fetal rights. IH Making 
manslaughter of a fetus a crime would send California one step 
further down the slippery slope of fetal rights. I lIi In their well-
intentioned zeal to protect fetuses, the Legislature must be ever 
cognizant of the trade-off between fetal rights and women's 
rights; according rights to fetuses often means taking rights 
away from women. ll6 The California Legislature must be careful 
not to elevate fetuses to first class citizens at the cost of making 
women second class ones.117 
Brian R. Paget* 
113. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. 
114. See People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ill. 1980) ("The extent to which the 
unborn child is accorded the legal status of one already born is one of the most debated 
questions of our time."). Put another way, the Flores decision raises the question-when 
does life begin? Different societies have adopted vastly different views on the nature of 
human life and the point at which it begins and is legally protectible. MacCartee, supra 
note 65, at 273. See generally Webb, supra note 65, at 183-85 (discussing ancient Greek, 
Catholic, and Jewish theories of life). 
115. Paltrow, supra note 108, at 42. 
In the eyes of many, the spector of continuing women's 
oppression looms large, and the prospect of a slippery slope 
that will erode hard-won reproductive freedoms is seriously 
entertained. Although fetal endangerment during the third tri-
mester is not "protected" as a privacy interest by Roe v. 
Wade, the recent prosecutions are sometimes believed to be 
part and parcel of the'increasing pressure to which that deci-
sion is being subjected. 
John Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Fetal Endangerment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/ 
Spring 1990, at 11, 11. 
116. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. 
117. See Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 177 ("By elevating the legal status of 
the fetus, it is possible that the courts and legislatures will disregard or subordinate the 
rights of the pregnant woman."). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
61
et al.: California Law Survey
































































Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/10
INSURANCE LAW 
Insurance company did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
when it refused to issue an umbrella liability insurance policy 
to a homosexual couple on the grounds that they were not 
married. 
SUMMARY 
Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 8 Cal Rptr. 2d 593 
(1992). In Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange l , the California 
Court of Appeal unanimously held that two men who lived to-
gether in a homosexual relationship for eighteen years were not 
discriminated against in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act2 
when defendant insurance company refused to issue them a joint 
umbrella liability insurance policy.a Specifically, the court held 
that defendant insurance company's refusal to issue joint um-
brella coverage policies to unmarried couples did not discrimi-
nate against plaintiffs on the basis of sexual orientation:' The 
court refused to extend the Unruh Act to include marital status 
as a protected category. I! In addition, the court found that de-
fendant insurance company had a legitimate business purpose 
for using marital status to determine eligibility for joint um-
brella liability policies.6 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs Larry Beaty and Boyce Hinman, a gay couple, 
lived together for eighteen years. They bought a home, taking 
title as joint tenants, in 1984. They maintained joint credit card 
and bank accounts and jointly owned two cars and the furnish-
ings in their home. Their wills and life insurance policies each 
named the other as primary beneficiary. Defendant Truck Insur-
1. Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992). 
2. Unruh Civil Rights Act. CAL: CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983). 
3. Beaty. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. 
4. Id. at 597. 
5.Id. 
6. Id. at 599. 
1103 
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ance Exchange issued them joint homeowners and automobile 
insurance policies.7 
Plaintiffs applied for a joint umbrella liability insurance 
policy8 from defendant in the amount of one million dollars, but 
defendant denied their application on the grounds that such pol-
icies are only issued to married couples.9 Defendant offered 
plaintiffs separate insurance policies, each with its own pre-
mium, but plaintiffs refused the policies because they wanted a 
joint policy with the same premium as would be charged a mar-
ried couple. lo 
Plaintiffs requested that the California Department of In-
surance rule on whether defendant's refusal to issue them a joint 
umbrella policy violated sections 679.71 and 1852 of the Califor-
nia Insurance Code. ll The Department informed plaintiffs that 
it would take no action on their behalf, but plaintiffs were free 
to pursue any legal remedies. 12 
In September 1989, plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior 
court, seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief. IS 
Plaintiffs asserted that the insurance company violated the Un-
ruh Civil Rights Actl • and sections 679.71 and 1861.05111 of the 
7. [d. at 594-95. 
8. Umbrella liability insurance policies are sold at comparatively low cost and pick 
up where primary coverage ends. These policies give financi~l security and peace of mind 
to the insured. 8A ApPLEMAN. INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4909.85 (1981); Beaty, 8 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. 
9. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. 
10. [d. at 594. 
11. California Insurance Code Section 679.71 prohibits discrimination by an insurer 
on the basis of marital status, sex, race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. This 
section also prohibits the use of these categories in risk prediction. Insurance companies 
set rates and grant or deny coverage based upon their prediction of risk of insuring a 
certain person or thing. CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West 1983). Section 1852, now repealed, 
related to standards applicable to rates. CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (repealed 1988). 
12. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. 
13. [d. 
14. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983). California 
Civil Code Section 51 provides in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free 
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disa-
bility are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever. 
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California Insurance Code.16 The trial court sustained defend-
ant's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the ac-
tion. 17 On appeal, plaintiffs argued only that defendant's refusal 
to issue them a joint umbrella policy constituted arbitrary and 
unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.1s . . 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs argued that defendant insurance company vio-
lated the Unruh Act by discriminating against them in two ways. 
They alleged discrimination on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion and on the basis of their marital status.19 
I. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
The court first held that the insurance company did not dis-
criminate against plaintiffs on the basis' of their sexual orienta-
tion20 and thus did not violate the Unruh Act based on that clas-
sification.21 The court, citing its earlier decision in Hinman v. 
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or 
privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or 
which is applicable alike to persons of [the above enumerated 
categories]" CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983). 
California Civil Code Section 52 provides in part: "Whoever ... makes any discrim-
ination, distinction or restriction on account of sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, na-
tional origin, or blindness or other physical disability ... is liable for each and every 
such offense." CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 1983).' 
15. California Insurance Code Section 1861.05 forbids approval of rates which are 
unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of the Insurance Code. CAL. INS. CODE § 
1861.05 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). 
16. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. 
17. Id. at 595. 
18. }d. 
19. Id. at 596-97. 
20. In reference to the term "sexual orientation", the court stated in a footnote, 
"We use the term 'sexual orientation' to refer generally to a person's sexual habits, prac-
tices, predilections, or compulsions with respect to heterosexuality, homosexuality, etc." 
Id. at 596. 
21. Sexual orientation is not one of the characteristics specifically enumerated in the 
Unruh Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983). However, courts have held that the Unruh 
Act forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The court in Beaty cited 
the following cases supporting that proposition: Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 
(1984); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983); 
Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982). 
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Department of Personnel Administration,22 stated that all un-
married couples were treated the same by defendant insurance 
company.23 Therefore, the company did not discriminate against 
plaintiffs on the basis of their homosexuality since all unmarried 
couples, heterosexual or homosexual, were denied joint umbrella 
liability coverage by defendant.24 Thus, plaintiffs' claim that de-
fendant violated the Unruh Act by discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation failed. 
II. MARITAL STATUS 
The court next evaluated whether plaintiffs could sustain 
their claim of discrimination on the basis of marital status in 
violation of the Unruh Act. 211 The court held they could not, be-
cause the Unruh Act could not be extended to include marital 
status, and because the insurance company had a legitimate bus-
iness purpose in using marital status as a factor to assess eligi-
bility for umbrella coverage liability policies.26 
A. UNRUH ACT NOT EXTENDED TO INCLUDE MARITAL STATUS 
The court cited Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV to 
support its decision not to extend the Unruh Act to include mar-
ital status as an additional protected category.27 The court read 
Harris as concluding that the Legislature intended the scope of 
22. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985). 
23. In Hinman, the same plaintiffs as in the instant case brought an action against 
the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) asserting a violation of their consti-
tutional rights to equal protection. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
court's holding that the state's policy of denying dental benefits to unmarried partners of 
state employees did not unlawfully discriminate against homosexual employees in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The DPA offered dental coverage only to married couples and did not distinguish 
between heterosexual and homosexual couples. Thus, the distinction applied equally to 
all unmarried partners whether heterosexual or homosexual. [d. at 413. 
24. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596. 
25. The Unruh Civil Rights Act does not include marital status as an enumerated 
category protected from discrimination. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983). 
26. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. 
27. In Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that a landlord did not discriminate against plaintiff tenants in 
violation of the Unruh Act by refusing to rent to them when their income was less than 
three times the rent because the criterion applied uniformly and neutrally to all persons 
regardless of personal characteristics. The court refused to extend the act to protect 
against such action. 
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the Unruh Act to be confined to discrimination specifically enu-
merated within the Act.28 In Beaty, the court stated that al-
though Harris did not overrule prior case law in which the Un-
ruh Act was extended to classifications not specifically 
enumerated, Harris did require'careful weighing so that any fu~ 
ture expansion of protected categories would be consistent with 
legislative intent.29 The court in Beaty found that the Legisla-
ture intended to confine the Unruh Act to the categories enu-
merated in Sections 51 and 52 of the California Civil Code.30 
The court reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to in-
clude marital status in the list of protected categories, it would 
have done so explicitly since it used a specific list in two sepa-
rate code sections of the Unruh Act.31 
In deciding not to extend the Unruh Act to include marital 
status as a protected category, the court stated "there is a strong 
policy in this state in favor of marriage"32, and that including 
marital status among the protected categories would frustrate 
this policy.33 The court further stated that the Legislature, and 
not the courts, should determine whether nonmarital relation-
ships deserve the same protection afforded marital relation-
ships.34 The court cited several statutes in which the Legislature 
included the term "marital status" in anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. 31i Thus, since the Legislature has used the term in other 
forms of anti-discrimination statutes, it would have used, the 
28, Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 597. 
29. Id. 
30.ld. 
3!. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (West 1983), 
32, The court cited the following cases as support for this proposition: Elden v. 
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (CaL 1988); Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 
904 (CaL 1983); and Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin. 213 CaL Rptr. 410 
(1985). Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 598. 
33. Beaty, at 598. 
34. Id. at ~OO. 
35. Among the statutes cited by the court were: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6 
(West 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.20 (West 1982); 1812.30 (West 1985); CAL. CORP. 
CODE §§ 5047.5, (West 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 45293 (West 1978); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 
308 (West 1977 and Supp. 1992); CAL. FIN. CODE § 40101 (West 1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§§ 8310, 12920-21, 12926-27, 12930-31, 12935, 12940, 12955, 12993, 12995, 18500, 19572, 
19702, 19704, 19793, 54701.12, 65583 (West 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY C;ODE §§ 
1365.5,33050, 33435, 33436, 33724, 33769, 35811, 37630, 37923, 50955, 51602 (West 1990); 
CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West 1983); CAL. PROB. CODE § 401 (West 1991); CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE §§ 5080.18, 5080.34 (West 1984); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10000, 18907 (West 
1991). Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 598. 
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term in the Unruh Act as well, had it intended marital status to 
be a protected category.36 
The language of Civil Code Section 51 indicates that the 
Legislature did not intend to create rights or privileges, but 
rather intended only to assure that once a business establish-
ment extended a service, the service be available without dis-
crimination based on the enumerated attributes. Thus, so long 
as defendant insurer's policy was applicable alike to all persons 
regardless of race, color, sex, religion, etc.37, it did not violate the 
Unruh Act. Here, the defendant's practice of issuing joint um-
brella coverage policies only to married couples applies equally 
to the above categories and therefore does not violate the Unruh 
Act.3s 
B. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE 
The court held that although the Unruh Act forbids dis-
crimination on an arbitrary basis,39 the defendant did not dis-
criminate arbitrarily as it possessed a legitimate business pur-
pose which justified different treatment.40 The insurance 
company could use marital status in predicting risk and con-
clude that an unmarried couple lacks the assurance of perma-
nence necessary to assess with confidence the risks insured 
against in a joint umbrella policy.41 The court cited Hinman as 
support for its conclusion that requiring insurance companies to 
use some other means to predict risk would be an undue bur-
den.42 In order to assess the risk with regard to unmarried 
couples, the insurer would be required to undertake a "massive 
intrusion" into the applicants' privacy by asking questions about 
36. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
37. The court cited the portion of California Civil Code Section 51 which provides: 
"This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is 
conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, 
race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability." [d. 
38. Id. 
39. Although the Unruh Act does not contain specific language prohibiting arbitrary 
discrimination, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the Act as prohibiting such 
discrimination. Harris, 805 P.2d at 878; In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970); Beaty, 8 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 598. 
40. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
41. Id. at 599. 
42. Id. 
68
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/10
1993] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 1109 
their relationship which would lead to inconsistent results,43 
The court stated that the consequences of upholding plain-
tiffs' claim would be that defendant and the court would have to 
treat plaintiffs as a married unit. Married couples are entitled to 
receive special consideration.44 The court found that extending 
the Unruh Act to include plaintiffs would contravene the strong 
public policy in favor of marriage. The court finally concluded 
that plaintiffs must look to the Legislature if they wish to legiti-
mize the status of a homosexual partner.45 
CRITIQUE 
The court's claim that defendant insurance company did 
not discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of their sexual 
orientation because defendant insurance company refused to is-
sue joint umbrella policies to all unmarried couples46 is not con-
vincing. Heterosexual couples can get married if they wish, 
which allows them to receive the economic benefits of marriage 
such as joint umbrella liability policies. Homosexual couples, 
however, do not have any recourse as their marriages are not 
recognized by law.47 They cannot receive the benefits of being 
married even though they intend to stay together permanently 
and live in all respects as a married couple. The court should 
have considered this factor when deciding whether exclusion of 
unmarried couples from joint umbrella liability policies really 
did discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
The court's finding that defendant did not violate the Un-
ruh Act by discriminating on the basis of marital status is 
equally unconvincing. 
First, the court's reasoning for refusing to extend the Unruh 
Act to cover discrimination on the basis of marital status is un-
persuasive. The court incorrectly read Harris as absolutely 
prohibiting courts from extending the Unruh Act to cover dis-
43.Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 600. 
46. Id. at 596. 
47. The California Civil Code defines marriage to be a civil contract between a man 
and a woman. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983). Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600. 
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crimination based on marital status. In Harris, the California 
Supreme Court refused to extend the Unruh Act to cover dis-
crimination based on economic status. The plaintiffs in that case 
were denied the opportunity to rent an apartment because their 
income did not amount to three times the amount of the rent, 
even though they could afford the rent.48 The court in Harris 
did find that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the 
Unruh Act to enumerated characteristics and similar personal 
characteristics having nothing to do with the economic ability to 
pay rent, but did not find that the Act covered only the enumer-
ated characteristics.49 Arguably, marital status is like the allowa-
ble prote'cted categories in that a marriage certificate does not 
indicate ability to pay for something. It does indicate a personal 
status of a person, defining whether or not he or she is involved 
in a legally recognized relationship. Thus, marital status is more 
like a personal characteristic, such as religious beliefs or geo-
graphical origin,IIO than an economic characteristic, such as earn-
ing more than three times the rent of an apartment. III The court 
in Harris cited other decisions in which the Unruh Act was ex-
panded based on personal characteristics such as unusual 
clothes or dress, age, and homosexuality and did not ov.errule 
them.1I2 Thus, Harris requires careful scrutiny before extending 
the Unruh Act's enumerated categories, but does not completely 
prohibit such extension. 
The court also found that since the Legislature included the 
term "marital status" in other legislation, it would have used the 
term in the Unruh Act if it intended to include that class as a 
protected category.1I3 However, this argument ignores the fact 
that the Legislature has not made contrary changes to the Un-
ruh Act following cases where unlisted personal characteristics 
were included as protected under the Act.1I4 The Legislature is 
48. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 874 (Cal. 1991). 
49. Harris, 805 P.2d at 883. 
50. Religious beliefs and geographical origin are enumerated in the Unruh Act. CAL. 
CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983). . 
51. Harris, 805 P.2d at 874. 
52. Among the cases cited were In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970) (unconventional 
dress or physical appearance); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982) 
(families with minor children); Rolon v. Kulwitzy, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (homosexu-
ality). Harris, 805 P.2d at 879. 
53. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
54. Harris, 805 P.2d at 880. 
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presumed to have knowledge of appellate court decisions. 55 If 
the Legislature really intended to limit the Unruh Act to only 
the enumerated categories, then it would have enacted or 
amended legislation, after these cases, where. the terms of the 
new legislation would specifically state that the Act could not be 
extended to protect categories not included in its language. 
Third, the court was unpersuasive when it decided that the 
insurance company had a legitimate business interest in issuing 
joint umbrella policies to married couples only. The court's con-
clusion that marital status is a reliable way to predict risk (be-
cause an unmarried couple lacks assurance of permanence56) in 
insuring couples jointly fails in light of the fact that fifty percent 
of all new marriages are destined to end in divorce. 57 
In addition, the court's finding that requiring insurance 
companies to use some other means to predict risk would be an 
undue burden lacks merit. Insurance companies could continue 
evaluating risk of insuring or providing coverage to a married 
couple simply by looking at their marriage certificate. They 
could evaluate risk in insuring unmarried couples by utilizing a 
simple questionnaire. 58 . 
The court found that the insurer would be required to un-
dertake a massive intrusion into the privacy of unmarried 
couples to evaluate their insurance risk. 59 However, this intru-
sion could entail nothing more than general questions about 
55. [d. at 879 .. 
56. One writer commented: 
"Policies that treat married and unmarried couples differ-
ently are demeaning to unmarried lesbian and gay couples. 
Such policies lend credence to the stereotype that nonmarital 
relationships are transitory, frivolous, morally reprehensible, 
or simply unimportant. These stereotypes are grounded in a 
marital status classification that arbitrarily defines relation-
ships in purely legal as opposed to factual terms." 
John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the 
Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1435 (1991). 
57. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Valuing the Family, 24 NAT'L J. No. 27 at 1562 (July 
1992). 
58. The questionnaire could ask questions that would indicate stability in the rela-
tionship. Examples of these are: how long the couple has lived together, whether their 
home, cars, and other belongings are owned jointly, whether they have joint bank ac-
counts or credit cards, and whether they have any other joint insurance policies. 
59. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. ·2d at 595. 
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their relationship. These types of questions are certainly not as 
intrusive as questions asked when people apply for health or life 
insurance. There, applicants must answer detailed questions 
about medical history and often submit to a physical examina-
tion, including a urine or blood test. In addition, unmarried 
couples who did not wish to answer questions about their rela-
tionship could opt for individual umbrella policies. The option 
of applying for joint coverage should not be denied to couples 
simply because the court feigns concern for their privacy. 
Finally, the Court avoided its duty when it concluded that 
plaintiffs must wait for legislation if they wish to legitimize the 
status of homosexual partners. Courts should step in to contra-
vene injustice when the Legislature is slow to act.60 It is the 
courts' duty to spot flaws or omissions in the law and to issue 
decisions to correct them. 
CONCLUSION 
In the modern world, a continually increasing number of 
couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, make homes to-
gether outside of the legal bonds of marriage.61 Where, as in 
Beaty, a couple has lived together a very long time, and has es-
tablished a financial base together, it is sad that the court is so 
quick to allow a business establishment to differentiate, for so-
called risk prediction purposes, between them and a legally mar-
ried couple. The only true difference between the two is that the 
latter had participated in a legal ceremony and has a piece of 
paper called a marriage certificate. 
This result is especially disheartening when the couple is 
gay and is prohibited from forming a legally recognized union. 
While the Beaty case reflects the current state of the law regard-
ing unmarried couples, hopefully, there will be a day when 
60. The United States Supreme Court defined the role of courts to apply a more 
searching judicial inquiry to protect discrete and insular minorities. See United States v. 
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
61. See John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Propo-
sal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1415 (1991). 
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courts, legislatures, and businesses form policies that conform to 
the realities of today's diverse society. 
Helen Silva* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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